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The legal meaning of "non discrimination" in international trade
In an essay with the legal and institutional aspects of discrimination
or non-discrimination in international trade, it is impossible to start
without a clear definition of what is meant by the term discrimination.
Since in common usage almost any behaviour dealing with camparable cases
in different ways can be called discrimination, such a term is too vage a
basis for legal considerations.
At first glance, different meanings of the same term seem to imply a
high degree of confusion. This is, however, no speciality of the word
"discrimination", nor is, in our particular case, the danger of confusion
very great. Just because of the fact that in common usage so many forms of
behaviour are called discrimination in favour of one party or against another
a limited and clear legal definition is such a different thing that a mix-up
can easily be avoided. Economists and politicians must only be warned that
actions which they describe as discrimination - correct in their own termin-
ology - need not have legal consequences. Only if they have to deal with forms
of discrbination which have, at the same time, the characteristics of the legal
definition, may they expect or induce legal consequences.
This leaves us with the task of finding a definition of the term discrimin-
ation which can be used as the basis for legal considerations. Fortunately,
this does not necessitate a lengthy analysis, since there is a fairly broad
consensus among international lawyers in this respect. We can start, then, from
a generally accepted definition and adopt that of Hyder in his book about
trade discrbination: "The term discrimination, though often used in various
contexts in international law has seldom been defined. Notwithstanding, the
fact that it has different contextual connotations, it is generally used
to connote unequal treatment of equals either by the bestowal of favours
or imposition of burdens. Therefore, whenever discrimination is referred
to in the context of international law, there is an implicit assumption
of its relation to a norm, or sets of norms prescribing equality of treat-- 2 -
ment. In addition, discrimination generally carries with it the idea of un-
fairness".
As we are concerned,here with the legal meaning of discrimination, or
ratherron-discrimination, we can safely begin with this characteristic:
unequal treatment with regard to a norm which prescribes equal treatment.
This underlines the above statement that actions, which in general dis-
cussion, especially in economic discussion, are called "discrimination"
are not necessarily discrimination in the legal sense. Take, for instance,
the case of some countries, non-members of the GATT, demanding most-fav-
oured-nation treatment by the contracting parties of the General Agree-
ment. Probably, they can claim unequal treatment, since the goods exported
by them are subject to heavier customs than comparable goods which are
supplied by member states of the GATT. Nevertheless, this is not dis-
crimination in the legal sense for there is no legal norm comelling the
participating parties of the GATT to give equal treatment to non-members.
In an economic sense, on the other hands one may speak of discrimination
if there is, in fact, unequal treatment with regard to customs duties.
At least, this is often done, rather carelessly, I think, for it is sel-
dom that somebody bothers to underline that such discrimination is nothing
more than unequal treatment by a country or group of countries with re-
gard to customs duties. A differentiation in this limited field mights
however, be justified on account of inequalities in other respects, and
should, therefore, not be condemned off-hand. This must be borne in mind
even when talking about discrimination in the broad sense described above.
Another claim of discrimination may underline this point: non-members of
the EEC are known to complain of discrimination almost as long as the EEC
exists. True, their exports have to bear the charges laid down in the
Common External Tariff of the Community while exports by one EEC-country
to another are imported duty-free. Whoever calls this unequal treatment
discrimination is free to do so, but it is certainly not discrimination
Hyder, Equality of Treatment and Trade Discrimination in International
Law, The Hague 1968, p. 14.- 3 -
in the legal sense. One may, as EEC officials have often done, point to
inequalities in other fields, like the limitations of sovereignty accep-
ted by the member states of the Community, or the "solidarity" with re-
gard to common policies or common funds. States which do not accept the
same obligations and are, therefore, not "equal" in this respect should
not complain of inequalities with regard to customs treatment.
Although these considerations cannot and maybe should not prevent anybody
calling this unequal treatment discrimination in the broad sense, it should
be clear that the judgement ought to be modified, if a legal judgement is
implied by the usage of the term. If used in a broad sense, the term "dis-
crimination" can serve no other purpose than to state a fact with no judge-
ment intended.
Legally, we find that in our case the norm obliging the EEC to equal treat-
ment in this respect is missing. To be sure, among the contracting parties
of the General Agreement, EEC-countries included, Article I GATT exists,
prescribing non-discrimination in the form of most-favoured-nation treat-
ment. With regard to the relations between the EEC-states and third coun-
tries, however, this norm does not apply on account of the exception in
favour of customs unions and free-trade areas, which is to be found in
Article XXIV GATT. This statement needs3 of course, to be proved and this
will be done in a later section. For the moment it was only meant to serve
as an example: there is no discrimination in the legal sense even in case of
unequal treatment, and in spite of a norm that prohibits unequal treatment,
if an exception from the norm does apply.
From these observations, it follows that discrimination in the legal sense
can only be established if
1. unequal treatment with regard to certain burdens, favours, measures etc.
is ascertained,
2. a norm exists which obliges the states bound by it to grant equal treat-
ment to the partner states concerned,3. that norm is applicable to the case in question - and is not ruled out
by an exception.
Discrimination in this sense can result from different types of unequal
treatment, one of them dealing with nationals on the one hand and foreig-
ners on the other, the second dealing with foreigners of different na-
tionalities. Unequal treatment of the first type means that nationals
of the country in question are treated in certain differently (as a rule
better) than nationals of other countries. With regard to trade this di-
fferent treatment usually takes the form of charges (customs duties),
reglementations, formalities, prohibitions, or restrictions which are
applied to imported goods or services but not to goods and services pro-
duced at home. This sort of discrimination, although almost generally
practised will not be treated here, since the subject of this study is
discrimination in international trade alone, and not in comparison to
national trade. So, cases in which "national treatment" is claimed or
agreed upon, are excluded. This paper only deals with discrimination be-
tween foreigners of different nationalities.
Development and contents of the principle of non-discrimination
Legally, on obligation not to discriminate between different countries
in international trade can only exist, if there is a norm to this effect.
Such norms are, indeed, to be found in public international law. They are
contained in several bilateral treaties as well as in some multilateral
treaties. These treaties are the only sources of the legal principle of
non-discrimination. An international custom, as evidence of a general
1 2
practice accepted as law to this effect does not exist. Therefore,
only those states bound by treaty obligations have the legal duty to re-
frain from discriminating between partners with regard to whom they have
undertaken to do so. These countries are, however, numerous since - apart
Art.38 of the Statute of the International Conct. of Justice.
2
See the detailed and well documented discussion of this subject by
Kewenig, Der Grundsatz der Nichtdiskriminierung in Volkerrecht der
internationalen Handelsbeziehungen, Vol. 1, Bonn 1972, Ch.II.- 5 -
from partner states to other agreements - the number of contracting parties
to the GATT alone has reached eighty-one, plus fifteen countries which apply
the General Agreement on a de facto basis plus Tunisia which has acceded
provisionally.
Historically, the application of the principle of non-discrimination in the
2
form of a most-favoured-nation clause is first recorded in the year 1417.
Its extensive use as a safeguard against discrimination in international
treaties, however, dates back only a little more than a hundred years. In
1860 England and Bance concluded the so-called Cobden-Chevalier Treaty by
which each partner undertook to give the other the most favourable condi-
tions on the imports from that country, compared with the imports from any
other country.
This obligation was valid with regard to trading conditions contained in
agreements which already existed prior to the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, but
was to be applied equally with regard to future agreements. So the treaty
of 1860 laid down the essentials of most-favoured-nation treatment in prac-
3
tically the same form as the GATT has done in our times any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any pro-
duct originating in or distinated for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or des-
tined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
This sentence is, of course, a multilateral version of the most-favoured-
nation (MFN) clause, which can easily be translated into a bilateral ver-
sion comparable to the contents of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty. The further
The position in December 1972. GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
(BISD), 19th Suppl., Geneva 1973, p. VII.
2
See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Indianapolis 1969, p.249 with
extensive references.
Art. I para. 1 GATT.- 6
elaboration of Article IGATT is, however, for the most part, a result of the
experiences made in the practice of international trade policy since the
days of the second half of the nineteenth century. According to the General
Agreement, MFN treatment is to be applied
with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation,
with respect to charges imposed on the international transfer of payment
for imports or exports,
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation,
with respect to internal taxes,
and with respect to laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sales purchase, transportation, distribution or use of imported products.
No such sophisticated enumeration of possible objects of discrimination was
needed in the 1860 . In those days, the predominant tool, in fact practically
the only tool, the states used in their international trade policies, was
the levying and the variation of customs duties. Due to the gold standard,
reglementations with regard to the transfer of payments were not needed, and
the other barriers to trade either did not yet exist or were of little im-
portance in comparision to customs duties. This state of affairs, i.e. the
gold standard in monetary policy and the predominance of customs charges as
instruments of international trade policy remained the same up to the First
World War. During the period from 1860 to 1914, the MFN clause became an al-
most universally accepted part of international commercial treaties. Although
the time for international organizations and multilateral commercial treaties
had not yet come, this general application of the MFN clause led to a situation
in which the system of international trade was, in practice, governed by the
principle of non-discrimination. This means, that during the years preceeding
the First World War, there existed not only a rather uncomplicated international
Ibid., and Art. Ill GATT paras. 2 and 4.— 7 ~
monetary system but also a comparably simple or clear system of international
trade. Customs tariffs being the principale instrument of the states and this
instrument being used without discrimination on all products imported from all
major trading nations meant that importers and exporters alike had more or less
the same chances irrespective of the country of origin of the goods in question.
Conditions for MFN treatment prior to World War One
Whoever, on this account, tends to regard the period from 1860 to 1914 as a
sort of golden age for international trade should, however, remember the follow-
ing pre-conditions for this impression:
1. There was no question of a "national treatment", of free trade. Customs
duties were applied, for fiscal as well as for protective purposes. This
means, even in that "golden age", discrimination existed. Although, ge.nerallys
states gave equal treatment to products imported from different countries^
they certainly discriminated against imports in favour of domestic products.
2. The state of non-discrimination with regard to imports was limited to customs
charges. That this, practically, meant non-discrimination in international
trade* reflected the fact that international trade policy was in a way still
"underdeveloped". The many instruments, measures and tricks apart from
tariff variations which are now known were not yet in use. One may regret
that international trade policy has lost this state of innocence, but it
has done so, and now more and new problems must be taken into account.
3. Besides, even in the period before World War One and even when considering
tariff policy, states were not totally innocent. They used to differentiate
tariffs in order to circumvent the obligation not to discriminate between
imports from different trading partners. While formally honouring this ob-
ligation, they found ways to split tariffs and to define the new tariff
headings in a way that they described only products from countries that
should receive favoured (although at the same time, most-favoured) nation
treatment. So, in a much-cited commercial treaty with Switzerland of April
12th 19O4s Germany wanted to favour imports of Swiss cattle. In order to- 8 -
make this possible in spite of the German obligation to give her other
trading partners MFN treatment, the tariff position was split and a new
heading was found which only fitted mountain, especially Swiss cattle:
large dapple mountain cattle or brown cattle reared at least 300 metres
above sea level and having a grazing period of at least one month each
year at more than 800 metres above sea level.
4. The international trading community was much more uniform than it is to-
day. It was composed of the European and American nations, some of which
had colonies or protectorates, but which, with regard to international
trade, were on a more or less equal footing. Protecting the interest of
less developed countries was no problem for the international community.
The nations now known as LDCs were then, as colonies, parts of separate
systems dominated by an industrially developed state which was responsible
for their international relations or they were, although industrially not
fully developed, producers of primary or agricultural goods, and had
as such comparative advantages in these fields which sufficed to make them
on the whole equally privileged partners in international trade.
Points 1 and 3 need no longer concern us here. They have remained unchanged
to a large extent: discrimination is still not a subject discussed in relation
to national producers, and the splitting of tariff positions in order to
favour imports from certain trading partners without violating the MFN ob-
ligation is still in use. On the other hand, the situation with regard to
points 2 and 3 has changed dramatically.
As far as point 2 is concerned, the art of international trade policy has been
"refined" since 1914. All those subjects cited in Article 1 of the General
Agreement - apart from the age-old customs duties - are tools which were either
not yet used before the First World War or were insignificant if compared with
tariffs. Now these non-tariff or para-tariff barriers to international trade
have become so prominent that the discussion about non-discrimination canict
be limited to tariffs but must embrace them, too.
Regarding point 4, one is forced to notice that the international trading
community has changed enormously since 1914. There are no longer a few dozen9 -
partners which consider themselves, and are considered, as equal, and which
apply the same standards to their dealings and agreements with each other.Now
we find one group of nations which are industrialized or regarded as industria-
lized, and either called market economies or capitalist economies. Another
group of countries is also industrialized, but their economies are either
called centrally planned or socialist. And a third group is called developing
countries, some of them in a rather advanced stage of industrialization others
with no industry at all, but all of them with claims to privileges in their
dealings with the industrialized groups.
MFN treatment and the modern scene in monetary and commercial policy
These changesi the appearance of new tools of international trade policy
and the differentiation of the members of the international trading systems
according to their methods of organizing their economies and of their stage
of industrialization, are the main reasons why the simple system of 1913 no
longer exists, and why the most-favoured-nation clause in the old sense has
lost its importance and, perhaps, its raison d'etre.
The first event to shake the old order was the invention of instruments other
than tariffs in the international trade policy. There is no need here to trace
this development in all its details. It may suffice to call special attention
to exchange controls and quantitative restrictions of imports, leaving aside -
at least for the moment - restrictions to exports and other non-tariff barriers.
As is well known, exchange controls and quantitative restrictions of imports
were the main instruments used during the inter-war period to check balance
of payments difficulties. They were caused by the downfall of the old mone-
tary system, the gold standard, and they resulted in the downfall of the old
trading sysasm, the main characteristic of which was the MFN treatment.
This was certainly a remarkable event in the history of non-discrimination in
international trade. Therefore, some details must be given, not only for histo-
rical reasons but also as an experience to be taken into account in further
deliberations on this topic.- 10 -
The "localization" in time is easy; the gold standard can be regarded as being
broken-down in the late twenties, when the United Kingdom gave up her attempts
to return to the pre-war model. The introduction of exchange controls followed
when the partner states of the monetary system "discovered" that they had only
scarce reserves of foreign exchange and that they had to economize on them, using
them only to pay for "essentials", banning "luxury imports". This meant, of
course, that imports had to be reconciled with the availability of foreign
exchanges, hence the invention of import restrictions which were qualitatively
limited: a fixed amount of US dollars was available for imports of specific
goods.
As can easily be seen, this system did not yet mean the break-down of most-
favoured-nation treatment. If imports were only limited by the scarcity of an
internationally exchangeable currency - such as the US dollar or the pound
sterling - MFN treatment was still possible. For US dollars, one could imports
say, steel-forming machinery from every country able to supply such goods. But
internationally exchangeable currency, became a scarce good, too. It had to be
reserved for imports which could not be had from other sources i.e. which could
not be obtained in exchange for home-made products. This was the 'great invention
1
of the early thirties: against a certain amount of, say, French exports in auto-
mobiles was exchanged an equal amount of, says Yugoslavien exports of bauxite.
In order to realize this transaction, only a common denomination was needed,
which could easily be found in one of the generally traded currencies, i.e.
US dollars or pounds sterling.
It must be stressed, however, that these currencies had no other purpose than
to serve as a common denominator. Payment was not envisaged in either of these
currencies. What was intended was a simple barter of automobiles against
bauxite, with only the value of both commodities determined by either dollars
or pounds. And, on account of this auxiliary role of either currency, the end
of most-favoured-nation treatment can be clearly recognized; if only a barter
agreement between France and Yugoslavia was intended, and other currencies were
no more than a common denominator, there was no room for MFN treatment. Neither
could France import bauxite from Hungary on this basis, nor could Yugoslavia
import automobiles from Germany.- 11 -
This was exactly what happened during the Depression: the inventions of new
tools in international trade (foreign exchange controls and quantitative re-
strictions on international trade) served to bring back a situation which many
people regarded as a relict from stone age times, i.e. that of barter between
two countries with a fixed amount of goods which the one could supply and the
other could use and vice versa. These barter agreements were, of course^ rather
limited in scope, and it is no accident, therefore, that international trade
declined dramatically during the third and fourth decades of this century.
Revival of MFN treatment after the Second World War
In order to revise this tendency and to promote the international division of
labour to the advantages of every nation, the abolishment of discrimination in
international trade was envisaged. Champions of this idea were the United
States, whose Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had, from 1934 onwards fought
for the elimination of most barriers to international trade. At the end of
World War Two she was in a unique position; being creditor of almost the whole
world, one of the victorious nations, and the state with the largest resources
and the strongest productive capacities of the world, the US could impress
on the war-devasted countries of Europe her ideas of the future world trading
order. One of those, and probably the most significant one, was the idea of
most-favoured-nation treatment.
MFN treatment in the US proposals was, moreover, something different from MFN
treatment in former times. Then the clause was agreed to by two parties to a
commercial treaty. In other words most-favoured-nation treatment was arranged
bilaterally. It had the purpose of securing for one partner of the agreement
the most favourable treatment with regard to trade which the other partner
extended to any other country, and vice versa.
Now, in the talks about a new order for international trade after the war, the
US proposed multilateral MFN treatment, within the framework of an international
organization, the International Trade Organization (ITO). While the ITO did not
get started, the idea survived. Mulitlateral MFN treatment became embodied in- 12 -
the General Agreements which for most practical purposes has the characteristics
of an international organization.
The advantage of a multilaterally accepted obligation to give MFN treatment
as compared with the traditional bilateral kind,lies primarily in the much
more permanently binding nature of the former. Bilateral agreements can be
ended or changed simply by consensus between the two partner states. The more
parties there are to an international treaty, the more difficult it becomes to
reach an agreement to change that treaty. This simple pschological experience
can, to a large extents be applied to the case in question. This remains true
although at a closer looks and if the details are taken into consideration,
the actual operation and the effect of the GATT most-favoured-nation clause
are rather complicated. There ares on the one hand, the rules and procedures
used in negotiations among the contracting parties which influence the effect
of the clause to a large extent.
Interpretation of Art. I para. 1 GATT
As has become evident during the history of GATTS the following words or
phrases in Art.I para. 1 GATT especially need interpretation or explanation,
or should be emphasized:








(a) The fact that the contracting parties have under the MFN clause to extend
"any advangate, favour, privilege or immunity" to the other partner states of
For details see especially Jackson3 op.cit., with references.Bihl
- 13 -
the General Agreement is to be interpreted extensively. This issue came up in
a dispute between India and Pakistan, when India did not give excise tax rebates
for exports to Pakistan although such rebates were given for exports to other
contracting parties. According to a ruling by the chairman, which was accepted
by the parties, this different treatment with regard to the tax rebates al-
ready constituted a discrimination prohibited by Art. I para. 1 GATT.
(b) In the General Agreement, the phrase "any product
3' is used deliberately.
No objects other than products are included by the GATT and its most-favoured-
nation clause, especially no invisibles like the rights of businessmen etc.
(c) The phrase "originating in'
r refers to the thorny question of the origin
of goods which are to be given MFN treatment. This is a difficult matter, espe-
cially if a product is composed of parts originating in different countries.
What percentage of the value of the final good should come from the exporting
country in order for it to qualify as originating in that country? Or by which
process can inputs from another country be transformed into goods which are to
be regarded as originating in the exporting country? Since origin in a partner
state is a precondition for the agreed treatment, i.e. MFN treatment a solu-
tion to the problem of origin is of great importance. The EEC and the EFTA have
laid down rules which appear to be working alright. This is not the case for
the GATT, although the problem has been under consideration since the early
2
fifties.
(d) "Any other country" in Art.I para. 1 really means any other country, in-
cluding states which are not parties to the General Agreement. If a partner
state of the GATT gives an advantage, favour etc. to a non-member, all contrac-
ting parties are entitled to the same treatment.
GATT8 BISD vol. 2, p.12.
2
A detailed description of the work is given in Jackson, op.cit., § 17.8.This seems to be rather self-evident, if seen in the light of the former
experience with bilateral MFN clauses. What use could such a clause have if
it did not refer to the treatment given to products of third countries ? But
there may be some reason to act differently if the MFN clause is embodied in
a multilateral treaty. At least the suggestion was made that the benefits of
the General Agreement should be reserved to members only.
(e) The obligation to treat the products of the contracting parties "uncondi-
tionally
1
1 on a most-favoured-nation basis needs no interpretation. This quality
of the clause should be expressly noted, however, since in the reform dis-
cussion, the idea that MFN treatment might only be given conditionally may
play a role.
(f) According to Jackson the phrase which has presented most difficulties
of interpretation is that of "'like products
7', which in some other articles of
2 3
the GATT returns in different words: "like commodity", 'like merchandise",
"like or competitive products". As far as products are concerned which fall
under the same tariff headings in the countries concerned, it can scarcely
be questioned that they are like products. But the reverse is not necessarily
true. Small differences in tariff headings may only conceal an almost complete
''likeness". Indeed, as already mentioned^ tariff headings are sometimes split
with the purpose of creating more or less artificial differences just in order
to circumvent the obligation to give MFN treatment.
One of the GATT cases in this connection concerns a Norwegian complaint that
Germany treated sprats, herrings and sardines differently, preferring sardines,
and thereby harming Norway which exported sprats and henings. The case could
be solved without giving an exact definition of the phrase "like products
 !.
The panel was not even forced to decide "whether the preparations of clupea
1 Ibid., § 11.4.
2 Art. VI § 7 GATT.
3 Art. VII § 2 GATT.
4 Art. XIX § 1 GATT.- 15 -
pilchardus, clupea sprattus and clupea harengus had to be generally treated as
like products. ' Norway and the Federal Republic reached a settlement and re-
lieved the panel of the burden of decision, an outcome which, by the way,
sheds some light on GATT procedure rather than finding general decisions
their principal object is conciliation between the parties of the actual case.
As a conclusion of this survey of some phrases contained in the MFN clause of
Art. I para. 1 GATT it can be noted that:
- no clear definition has, as yet, been given for "originating in"
or of "like products",
- "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" is to be interpreted extensively,
- ''any other country
5
1 includes states which are not parties to the General
Agreement,
- the clause applies only to products and not to "invisibles",
- most-favoured-nation treatment is to be given unconditionally.
Multilaterally versus bilaterally agreed MFN treatment
With regard to the merits of the multilateral MFN clause in the GATT, it was
noted above that it is, in practice, more stable than a bilaterally agreed
clause to the same effect. But before going into some detail, one advantage
should be noted which does not need a long discussion but is, nevertheless,
rather important: while bilateral agreements tend to bring about a complicated
network of differing duty rates depending on the treaty obligations of all
members of the international community, a multilateral agreement of the GATT
kind to which all major trading nations adhere, is bound to minimize confusion
as to which tariff of which country is applicable to which case. Although
there may still be a more-column tariff, the column showing MFN rates will be
the one generally in use.
This not only makes things easier for exports and imports who obtain a more
solid basis for their calculations, thus lowering one of the para-tariff barri-
ers to trade. A clear picture with regard to the valid tariffs in each case,- 16 -
moreover, lightens the tasks of the customs authorities. It helps to avoid
faulty customs charges, and it helps the other side to detect such faulty
charges and to start complaining, which, as will be shown later, is also made
easier and more effective within a multilateral framework.
Let us now turn to the argument that MFN treatment agree to in the multilateral
context of the GATT is more stable than would be the case if MFN treatment v/ere
arranged bilaterally. Of course, bilateral treaties to this effect can have
as long a duration as the parties wish, and this may be a very long time indeed.
But, and this is the points there is very little ground for hesitation if both
partners want to end or change the agreement. In other words: they are practi-
cally complete masters of these special rules of international law they have
created.
Moreover, one must bear in mind that violations of international obligations
do occur, and that they occur more frequently if the fear of retaliation is not
great. Crudely stated, the tendency to violate international obligations is ne-
gatively correlated with the fear of harmful reactions. If such reactions need
only be expected from one partner to an agreement, therefore, this tendency may
be stronger than in a case involving more partners.
Similar considerations can be applied if there is no question of a breach of
treaty obligations, but of "avoiding" them by means of escape clauses con-
tained in the treaty, or by recourse to the clausula rebus sic stantibus. Normal-
ly, if a state takes in an escape clause or in exceptional rules provided for
in the treaty or in international laws the other party is entitled to some
specified counter measures. So, escape action, although quite legal, is, as a
rule, also connected with reactions which are undesirable for the state using
the escape clause. Again, the harmful effects of such reactions tend to in-
crease with the number of the partner states of the treaty concerned.
In particular in: Multilaterally agreed MFN treatment as an advantage to less
developed countries
One further point must be added. It can be assumed that breaches of treaty
obligations and recourse to escape clauses are normally more easily resorted
to by economically strong countries if they have to do with smaller partners.•17
Retaliation or agreed counter measures by such partners will not have a strong
effect, simply because the influence of an economically less important partner
on the economy of the other is not great. If this is so, and the danger of
counter measures can practically be ignored, the temptation to have recourse
to either legal or illegal exceptions from a treaty obligation may be greater
than in a case in which reactions cf an economically strong partner are to be
feared.
This being the case, especially smaller countries tend to gain from a multila-
teralization of (he most-favoured-nation clause. The effect just described of
their economic weakness vanishes within, the multilateral framework. This means
that by multilateralization, small and economically weak nations receive some
protection against violations of treaty obligations or against frivolous re-
course to escape clauses by their stronger partners.
Such result is not only to be expected because of this constellation. There is
a further characteristic which works against deviations from MFN treatment, that
is the fact that the multilateralization of the MFN clause has taken place within
an international organization the GATT. There is no need here to discuss this
character of GATT in detail. For our purpose} it is sufficient to state that the
GATT has the institutional machinery for a discussion of all issues connected
with the agreement. It iss particularly, prepared to discuss complaints and to
examine the facts submitted by the parties concerned.
Under these circumstancess every member state, however, small or weak it may be>
has the right to present its case to the contracting parties and instigate a
complaints procedure. The case may be investigated by a working party. Every
member state may raise its voice in assistance to the state which claims to
have been harmed. And there may be, although this has not happened very often,
a decision to the effect that the accused party should stop violating its obli-
gations under the General Agreement. More often, there is some form of concila-
tion.- 18 -
One further point in favour of the multilateral solution must be added. It
has nothing to do with the prospects of complaints by smaller countries against
economically stronger contracting parties. On the contrary: in the multilateral
context, economically weak countries may gain just because their part in inter-
national trade is small. This is a consequence of the normal procedure used
in negotiations about trade (especially tariff) concessions.
In these negotiations, the countries which are principal suppliers of a product
start by submitting lists of requests for tariff reductions. These requests
may be answered by offers of such reductions by any country willing to do so.
However, of special interest are naturally the offers of those countries or
groups of countries which import great quantities of the product in question.
So, the outcome of the negotiations largely depends on the actions and reactions
of the economically stronger contracting parties. But if concessions are
finally reached, they are, because of the obligation to treat any contracting
party on an MFN basis, automatically extended to all member states, to the weak
ones as well, which may have had nothing to offer in return.
To be sure, less developed countries were complaining at the end of the Kennedy-
Round that the concessions worked out in the GATT-round concerned, overwhelm-
ingly, products of particular interest to the industrialized nations, while
the products which are the primary export articles of the LDCs had been ne-
glected. A comparision of percentages of concessions shows that this obser-
vation is correct. Moreover, during the preparations of the Kennedy-Round it
was expressly intended to lower the tariffs on goods exchanged between the
industrialized states to a particularly high degree. The most obvious example
is the proposal of President Kennedy to abolish the tariffs altogether on
products which are traded at a rate of 80 p.c. between the EEC and the USA.
Nevertheless, this argument does not anihilate the advantages of multilateral
MFN treatment to small countries as compared with bilateral MFN treatment. For
For a clear description of the rather complicated procedure see Curzon, op.
cit., p.72.- 19 -
during the Kennedy-Round, at least a number of tariff concessions were nego
tiated which were also useful to the LDCs. Other concessions may become useful
to some of them in the near future. In contrast, there is little chance of con-
cessions without reciprocity being gained by the LDCs by means of bilateral ne-
gotiations. So, even if the complaints cited are founded, they do not contradict
the conclusion that the multilateral method is helpful for the weak contracting
parties.
These observations seem to imply rather clearly that multilaterally agreed MFN
treatment is a device that furthers the stability and the extent of MFN treat-
ment over and above the state that can normally be reached by means of a bi-
lateral agreement. While* in my opinion, this is true, the point should not be
overemphasized. Although the effects of retaliation by a greater number of part
ners do more harm than those of a single and possibly economically weak one,
it is by no means sure that this sort of collective retaliation will occur.
First, it can legally only occur if every one of the contracting parties con-
cerned is harmed by the measures of the original "culprit". Only member states
which have been harmed by violation of the Agreement or by (legally sanctioned)
protective Cescape") measures are entitled to retaliation under the GATT. And
they are entitled only under circumstances specifically laid down by the Agree-
ment. And only one form of retaliation is allowed; the withdrawal of "substanti
ally equivalent concessions".
From this nature of the legally allowed counter measures it follows, secondly
that they are latently dangerous to apply. As Gerard Curzon vividly put it:
"... owing to the action of the most-favoured-nation clause, GATT could conse-
quently be unravelled like knitting."
Curzon, op. cit., p.109.- 20 -
For, the withdrawal of concessions to one country is likely to harm not only
the country which it is intended to "punish"„ but other as well. These, in
turn, being harmed, are entitled to withdraw concessions, and so on.
If such a "chain reaction" can be feared, it is small wonder that the weapon
of retaliation by withdrawal of concessions is applied only hesitatingly. This,
again, means that the arguments in favour of multilateral obligations to give
MFN treatment must be taken cum grano salis. But with this modification, they
remain valid.
Another point which may water-down the enthusiasm for multilateral agreements
on MFN treatment must be mentioned: to arrange for MFN treatment with one
single state is a thing the consequences of which can be estimated fairly well.
Moreover, if only two partners negotiate with each other, it is not too diffi-
cult to match the respective interests. If, on the other hands giving most-
favoured-nation treatment to one trading partner means giving the same treat-
ment to nearly a hundred nations, there might be some reluctance to ease con-
ditions erga omnes. Therefore, a potential willingness to lower tariff or
non-tariff barriers vis a vis one or some particular countries might be given
up on account of the spread-effect connected with the GATT version of MFN
treatment.
I think that after these general considerations the balance is still in favour
of the multilateral version of MFN treatment. But the case now must be considered
where one country, contracting party to the GATT, is to gain from multilaterally
agreed concessions, but is not willing to make equivalent concessions in return.
If this is a small country, possibly not yet fully industrialized, this may be
tolerated, or even accepted as a form of assistance to further economic de-
velopment. If, however, an industrialized country is privileged by multilateral
MFN concessions without giving comparable advantages to the other GATT partnersy
such a reward for non-cooperation will probably be resented} in spite of econo-
mic reasoning according to which the country which bwers tariffs is going to
gain from this transaction,- 21 -
This being so, a reluctance might probably result to lower tariffs or non-tariff
barriers erga omnes, and, since the multilateral General Agreement leaves no roon
for bilateral concessions to partners willing to compensates there might be a
reluctance to liberalize at all. Still, in spite of this further disadvantage,
I am in favour of the multilateral solution - particulary since it helps small
and / or less developed countries. Taking notice of the exceptions to Ar t.I
para 1 GATT may, however, tip the balance in the other direction. Or is the
opposite true ?
Exceptions to most-favoured-nation treatment according to the GATT
One attractive method to classify the exceptions to the rules of General Agree-
ment has been suggested by John H. Jackson: 1. universal exceptionss 2. parti-
cular exceptions and 3. violations of the GATT that have become tacit exceptions
from the obligation to grant MFN treatment. Jackson has also pointed out an-
other classification according to whether the recourse to the exception requires
2
(a) prior approval of the contracting parties, (b) notification of the GATTS
or (c) neither approval nor notification.
Both classifications refer to important differences either in the rules or
in the procedures which are essential for the understanding of GATT practice
and also with regard to the reform discussion; it can make a big difference
whether general or limited exceptions are provided for particular situations
or whether an action is subject to prior approval of the contracting parties
or can be resorted to unilaterally.
Universal exceptions can include exceptions to the most-favoured-nation prin-
ciple as well. For instance, according to Article XXV, the "Contracting Parties
3
may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this agreement.
Jackson, op.cit., p.536.
2 • • In the General Agreement the contracting parties, if they act as an institution
of the GATT are termed as CONTRACTING PARTIES; It will suffice here to use
"Contracting Parties."
3 Art. XXV para. 5 GATT.- 22 -
This general authority of the Contracting Parties can be used with regard to any
obligation of the General Agreement. Naturally, this includes the obligation to
grant MFN treatment to the other member states. In fact, the Contracting Parties
have already used the waiver authority for this purpose, the most famous example
being the waiver authorizing the GATT parties to grant general tariff preferences
to less developed countries.
Another rule of the GATT according to which the Contracting Parties may "autho-
rize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other
contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstance", is Article
XXIII para. 2. Here, again, the application of the MFN principle might be the
one which is suspended.
This does not mean, however, that every universal exception implies an exception
to the MFN principle. On the contrary: those universal exceptions which are truly
universal, i.e. which concern the whole bundle of GATT obligations at the same
time are, as a rule, to be resorted to undiscriminatingly. Take, for instance,
the case of a contracting party which is
 i(in the early stages of development"
and is entitled to a "specific measure affecting imports which it proposes to
2 introduce in order to remedy" its difficulties. Such a measure must observe
the obligation to treat all contracting parties alike, since "nothing in the
preceding paragraphs of this Section shall authorize any deviation from the pro-
visions of Article I, II and XIII of this Agreement."
Or, if we look at the exception from the general elimination of quantitative
. . 4 restrictions, we again find a reference to the obligation not to discriminate;
"No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any contracting party or on the
1 Art. XVIII para. 1 GATT.
2 Art. XVIII para.14 GATT.
3 Art. XVIII para.20 GATT.
4 Art. XI GATT.- 23 -
exportation of any product destined to the territory of any other contracting
party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or
the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly pro-
hibited or restricted.
 f
As a further 'universal" exception may be mentioned emergency action according
to article XIX. Here, no express reference to the MFN clause is given. There
seems9 however, to be a consensus that emergency action should be non-discrimina-
tory. Jackson for one is quite sure of that and cites an Interpretative Note
in the Havanna Charter: "'It is understood that any suspension, withdrawal or modi-
fication under paragraphs l(a), 1(b) and 3(b) must not discriminate against im-
ports from any Member country, and that such action should avoid to the fullest
- 2 extent possible, injury to other supplying Member countries."
Turning now to the "special" exceptionss expressly allowing departures from MFN
treatments it is noted that already Article I of the General Agreements which
lays down the MFN clause> tolerates exceptions to this obligation. These excep-
tions are due to practices already existing at the time when the GATT was con-
cluded. The most important of them are the Commonwealth preferences to which
the partners of the Commonwealth had agreed at the Conference of Ottawa in
1932.
3 It is hardly surprising that the countries concerned wanted to retain their
privileged positions on their respective markets, these being apart from economic
advantages, one of the not very numerous legal ties holding the Commonwealth
together. So they - and especially the United Kingdom - were not prepared to
accede to an agreement which abolished the Ottawa-preferencess and these were
legalized as an exception to Article I para. 1 GATT.
1 Art. XIII para. 1 GATT.
2
Jackson, op.cit., p.564, n.5.
3
They are listed in Annex A to the GATT.- 24 -
This was done in spite of strong US opposition, because the United States acted
as they also did in later times as an advocat of a ''pure" multilateral MFN
clause as the basis ('conerstone') of a sound order of international trade. This
did not prevent the US, however5 from claiming and achieving exceptions for her
own privileged relations to the Philippines, to the dependent territories of
the USA* and to Cuba.
Other preference systems allowed by Article I para. 2 and specified by Annexes
to the Agreement concern the territories of the French Union* the Benelux Customs
Union and the "neighbouring countries" Argentina/Bolivia/Peru and Syria/Lebanon/
Palestine/TransJordan.
Looking at the cases mentioned, it becomes clear that the importance of the pre-
ference systems tolerated by Article I para.2 GATT has diminished either because
they were given up altogether, as in the case of the US-Cuba relations or the
"neighbourhood" of Syria/Lebanon/Palestine/Transjordan, or they have been or
are about to be included into other preference systems. This is especially true
for the French, Benelux and, now for the Commonwealth system which were or are
brought into the EEC system, thereby changing from Article I para.1 preferences
to preferences falling under Article XXIV or Article XXV of the General Agree-






Undoubtedly, the most important exception from the MFN clause is the provision
sanctioning the formation of customs unions and free trade areas, and the conclu-
sion of interim agreements intended to lead to one of the two firms of regional
integration. Here the development which has taken place since the conclusion of
the General Agreement was, apparently, not foreseen. While in the preference
Such as the margin of preferences allowed. For detailed discussions see Jackson
op.cit., p.265, Curzon, op.cit.9 p.65, and Karin Kock, International Trade
Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, Stockholm 1969, p. 111.- 25 -
provisions of Article I para. 2 just discussed, the initial agitation has in the
course of time subsided because the object continually lost in importance, the
opposite has been true with regard to the provisions on regional integration. The
original intention of Article XXIV paras. 4 to 10 seems to have been to facili-
tate the close cooperation of a few neighbouring countries primarily with the aim
of furthering economic development of LDCs, and it looks as if the actual outcome
of the integration movement has been a genuine surprise> not only to the drafters
of the General Agreement.
The contents of Article XXIV is - like that of many other privisions of the GATT -
rather complicated. Principally it lays down some general basic requirements and
describes the characteristics of the regional arrangements which are sanctioned
by the General Agreement.
The first condition listed in Article XXIV for the "GATT-conformity" of a customs
union or a free trade area is that its purpose should be "to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of
other contracting parties with such territories."
However} there is and there will probably be no regional arrangement where the
parties claim that their primary intention is to hinder the trade with other
countries. But a statement to the contrary alone is certainly not a very solid
basis for the decision whether the regional agreement in question should pass
the test as to its conformity with Article XXIV para. 4} if indeed such a test
is intended by the formula chosen. So, the question is whether para. 4 is only
a statement of a principle, with practically no legal consequences, or whether
it is a legal requirement. If the second alternative is true, there ought to
be some criteria which could serve as a basis for a decision.
1 Art. XXIV para. 4 GATT.- 26 -
Now, economic theory seems to have provided a criterion for differenciating be-
tween regional arrangements preponderantly facilitating trade between the partners
and those preponderantly hindering trade with third countries. This is Viner's
criterion of whether the "trade-creating" or the "trade-diverting" effects of
a customs union prevail
free trade area as well).
a customs union prevail (whichs with some modification, can be applied to a
It has indeed been suggested that this criterion be applied and only those
arrangements accepted which are primarily trade creating. Kenneth W.Dam first




1 and then in his book "The GATT. Law and International Economic
3
Organization" proposed not only to apply the test "trade creation versus trade
diversion" within the context of Article XXIV para. 4 but moreover to make it
practically the only criterion for judging regional economic arrangements gene-
rally. This means, of course,, that the other paragraphs of Article XXIV are of
little or no value as criteria for the judgement to be passed on a particular
regional arrangement.
The other paragraphs have been written into Article XXIV, uowevers and as will
be shown in later sections of this essay, are continually applied in GATT prac-
tice when judging the regional arrangements which have been submitted to the
Contracting Parties for consideration. Since we have to do here (as a starting
point, at least) with the law as it is formulated in the international treaty
which is the General Agreement, we cannot, therefore> avoid de lege lata, taking
the existing rules it to consideration. We must, further, review the practice of
the GATT organs, since it may have contributed to the development of this parti-
cular branch of international law. This will, however9 enable us to form an opinic
as to the value of Kenneth Dam's ideas de lege ferenda, i.e. as a basis for a
reform of the rules of the General Agreement on the formation of regional economic
Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New York 1950.
2 "University of Chicago Law Review", XXX (1963) p.615.
3 Chicago, 1970.- 27 -
groupings as an exception to the general principle of non-discrimination.
In this analysis the following course will be following: first the rules laid
down in paragraphs 5 to 10 of Article XXIV will be listed. Second a short
analysis will be given of the deliberations and decisions in GATT on some of
the major regional groupings. Third, as a result of the findingss an opinion
will be submitted on whether paragraphs 5 to 10 and the GATT procedure in general
can be regarded as adequate methods of judging regional economic groupings. Fourth
thus prepared, we shall discuss whether or not there is a necessity to reform
Article XXIV, and whether Kenneth Dam's proposals are practicable.
Rules and Problems of Article XXIV paras. 5 to 10
Forming a list of the rules and problems of Article XXIV paragraphs 5 to 10 in
the order they are found in the Article, the first one is para. 5 which states
the general consent to the effect that "the provisions of this Agreement shall
not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of
a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area."
The meaning of the three different kinds of arrangements is set out primarily
in paragraphs 8(a), 8(b) and 5(c), respectively. Some additional requirements
as to customs unions and free trade areas are found in paragraphs 5(a) and
5(b).
Accordingly, "for the purpose of this Agreement" the legal definition of a
customs union is
"A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that,
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except where
necessary3 those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and- 28 -
XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to
substantially all the trade in products originating in such territoriess
and
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties
and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union."
Phrases which in this definition are particularly open to doubt and which,
accordingly, have caused long debates in GATT practice, are "substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories" and "substantially the same duties
and other regulations." The question iss. what part of trade and what degree of
unification of duties and other regulations is required in order to be regarded
as ''substantially all
!?. The only thing that seems to be sure in this connection
is that not all trade or all rules must be completely covered. But how much less
is admissible has been strongly debated during the deliberations among the con-
tracting parties - as will be seen in the later sections where we shall discuss
some of the regional groupings brought before the GATT.
Coming back to the GATT definition of a customs union, we still have to cite
paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV. Here the acceptance of a customs union by the
General Agreement is made subject to the condition that
"with respect to a customs unions or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect
of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement
shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general in-
cidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the
The exception concerns the application of quantitative restrictions and its
modalities (Art.XI to XV) and the "general exception"with regard to public
morals, health, conservation of natural resources etc. (Art.XX).- 29 -
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the
adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be."
Here, the doubtful phrase is that duties and regulations of the union shall not
"on the whole" be higher than those applied formally by the members of the union.
What "on the whole" means has again been the subject during the GATT discussions
on certain regional arrangements brought before the Contracting Parties. The theme
will, therefore, also be taken up in the sections dealing with the different re-
gional groupings.
As for how to determine whether the new duties or regulations are higher or not
than the former ones of the member states, this question is closely related to
the one already mentioned in connection with paragraph 4 of Article XXIV: what
method shall be applied to find out whether a particular regional arrangement
facilitates the trade between the partner states more than it hinders the trade
with third states? We shall come back to it in the final section dealing with
this fundamental problem.
Here it must be underlined, however, that the detailed definition of a customs
union also poses and leaves open the question of measurement. This is important:
it just might have been possible to avoid this problem, if the legal definition
of a customs union did not involve measurement of the different burdens and their
effects. Then, from a legal point of view, a customs union would have been admiss-
ible under the GATT, regardless of these diffeences. This, again, would have meant
that these problems were only worth discussing from an economic or political point
of view and, for a lawyer, de lege ferenda. As we have seen, howevers the measure-
ment question is at the same time a legal one, since it is part of the definition
given in paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV.
If we now turn to the definition of a free trade area "for the purposes of this
Agreement", we find in paragraph S(b):
"A free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations
of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI,
XIIS XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade- 30 -
between the constituent territories in products originating in such
territories."
There is nothing in this part of the definition of a free trade area which we
have not already encountered in the definition of a customs union. Again, excep-
tions permitted under Article XI to XV and XX, may be made. Again, we find the
phrase "substantially all the trade between the constituent territories'. And,
again it is a question of products "originating in such territories*'. I did not
expressly point out this latter phrase in connection with the customs unions,
since it is of no great importance there. It must, however, be underlined, when
speaking of a free trade area. On account of the fact that the member states of
such a grouping have different external tariffs and regulations for trade with
third countries, the problem of origin is a very grave one, necessitating rules
of origin which can be considerable barriers to trade with third countries.
As was the case with the definition of a customs union, the definition of a free
trade area must also be completed by a condition for the acceptability of the
grouping under the GATT3 namely,
"with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulation of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the
formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement
to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties
to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corres-
ponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same
constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area,
or interim agreement as the case may be."
We see, free-trade areas and customs unions are treated almost alike in the text
1 Art.XXIV para. 5(b) GATT.- 31 -
of the General Agreement. It seems somewhat surprising to meet again the phrase
that the duties and other regulations of the newly formed area vis-a-vis third
countries should "not be higher or more restrictive" than those which the member
states formerly applied. In a customs union which by definition has to have a
common external tariff and other common commercial regulations there is the
problem of determining the height of that new tariff and the form of those
(new) regulations. A free-trade area, on the other hand, has no common tariff
and no common commercial policy. Since these subjects remain in the competence
of the different member states it is not quite clear why the rules of the GATT
concerning regional groupings deal with the external tariffs and regulations in
a free-trade area at all. The member states were obliged by the general rules re-
garding these matters and remain so, irrespective of the formation of a free-tracie
area.
One reason for the inclusion of a norm with regard to matters of external trade
policy in a free-trade area might be to issue a special warning against the rai-
sing of tariffs on occasion of the regional arrangement. Although duties are
especially mentioned, there seems, however, to be no need for such a warning,
since the formation of a free-trade area is in principle no better excuse for a
violation of the obligations which the member states have under the General
Agreement than any other pretext.
Another reason for mentioning commercial regulations could be that the regulations
of the free-trade area might raise additional barriers to trade with third countries
for instances if a member state has to take recourse to an escape clause. In
such a case it could easily happen that the exception will be primarily used
against the imports from third countries - and not against those from the other
member stetes. Actually^ this outcome is rather unavoidable, given the common
internal market which the free-trade area aims at just as does the customs union.
So, also seen from this angle, the rule in paragraph 5 (b) seems to be of little
practical value, apart from its possible effect as a warning against abuse.- 32 -
A warning against abuse is also useful in connection with the formulation of
rules of origin. These could become non-tariff barriers to trade with third
countries, although again, some such effect appears to be an unavoidable symptom
of a free-trade area. But, be that as it may, and whatever the value of this
rule for a free-trade area, it is to be noted that Article XXIV GATT tries to set
a limit for the tariffs and trade regulations of regional arrangements of either
kind. They shall "not be higher or more restrictive" than the former tariffs and
regulations. This has to be so "on the whole" in a customs unions, while no
similar qualification is given (or can be given) for a free trade area.
The same requirements are applicable to the so-called interim agreements as
well as to "complete" customs unions or free-trade areas. There iss moreover,
an additional special regulation with regard to interim agreements alone;
2 :'Any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)
shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs
union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time."
This means two things;
First, an interim agreement must not be "final". It should lead to a definite
customs union or free-trade area, with (practically) no duties and other re-
strictive regulations of commerce between the member states. Since an interim
agreement will necessarily contain as first steps only limited preferences between
the partner states, it has to be assured that the arrangement in question will
develop into a genuine customs union or free-trade area. As a device to further
this end the demand to submit "plans aid schedules" has been conceived.
The second demand with respect to an interim agreement is that it should not
only actually lead to a complete customs union or free-trade area^ but do so
1 Art. XXIV para. 5(c) GATT.
2 That is sub-paras 5(a) and 5(b) of Art.XXIV GATT.- 33 -
"'within a reasonable length of time". As was to be expected, this requirement
inspired long debates on what was "reasonable" in the relevant cases brought
to the attention of the contracting parties.
This was the last of the more important rules of Article XXIV GATT.We are now
in a position to form the following summary:




While number 3 only refers to an "interim" phase, numbers 1 and 2 are "final".
They have to meet the following requirements:
(a) Duties and restrictive regulations of commerce are to be eliminated with
respect to ''substantially all" trade between the partner states.
(b) Duties and restrictive regulations applicable to trade with third countries
shall "not be higher or more restrictive'
1 than those valid before the forma-
tion of the grouping.
(c) With regard to customs unions this requirement concerns duties and restrictive
regulations "on the whole".
(d) Likewise only in customs unions ''substantially the same duties and regulations
of commerce" shall be applied by all member states vis-a-vis third countries.
Requirement (b) is also applicable to interim agreements. Additionally,
(e) Interim agreements shall include "a plan and schedule" for the formation of
a final groupings either a customs union or a free trade area.- 34 -
(f) Interim agreements shall lead to the final grouping "within a reasonable
length of time."
This list will, at the same time, facilitate the task now of analysing some
prominent regional economic arrangements which have been based on Article XXIV
GATT.
The European Economic Community
Not only measured by the volume of trade covered, the European Economic Community
is by far the most important example of a customs union.
Whether it is a customs union in the sense of Article XXIV was by no means taken
for granted. Or* to be precise3 when the treaty establishing the European Economic
Community was submitted to the contracting parties of the GATT for consideration,
it was submitted by the representative of the EEC as an interim agreement leading
to the formation of a customs union. This was, of course, correct since the
R.ome Treaty did not establish such a union at once but was to do so in steps
taking twelve (or possibly) fifteen years.
Accordingly, the Rome Treaty was aialyzed by the Contracting Parties as an
interim agreement, and it wass in fact, scrutinized so thoroughly as never again
seems to have been the case with other regional agreements submitted under
Article XXIV GATT. The analysis was instituted in the following way;
"At their Twelfth Session in October - November 1957S the Contracting
Parties appointed a Committee comprised of all government parties to
the General Agreement to examine the relevant provisions of this Treaty
and of the General Agreement and to consider the most effective method
of implementing the inter-related obligations which the six governments
had assumed under the two instruments. The Committee had the following
terms of reference:
Using the words of the report published in GATT, BISD, 6th Suppl. p. 63/09.- 35 -
A. To examines in the light of the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the
problems likely to arise in their practical application. Such examination
would include inter alia , the arrangements provided for in the treaty with
respect to tariffs, the use of quantitative restrictions, trade in agricul-
tural products and the association of overseas countries and territories with
the European common market.
B. To recommend, in the light of the. conclusions which result from the examination
provided for above,, such action as may be appropriate and desirable, including
a determination of the means of establishing effective and continuing co-
operation between the Contracting Parties and the European Economic Community.
C. To report to the Contracting Parties, and make such recommendations as may be
appropriate with respect to the continuation of the work of the Committee.
The Committee appointed four sub-groups to examine the questions enumerated
in paragraph A of its terms of reference."
As an example for the preparation of the Contracting Parties with regard to
the examination of an agreement under Article XXIV GATT this text is rather
instructive. An the activities of the Committee and the sub-Committee are
illustrated clearly by their reports reproduced in BISD, 6th Supplement.
Some of the most remarkable findings in these reports were:
With regard to the common external tariff of the Community, a controversy arose
over the admissable height of this tariff. As noted above, according to para-
graph 5(a) the duty rates of a customs union should not on the whole be higher
than the rates of the tariffs of the member states they replace. We have already
seen that this rule poses considerable problems of measurement. The Treaty of
Rome applied, with some moderations, a very simple calculation, namely the un~
pp. 70 et seq.- 36 -•
weighted arithmetic average of the rates of the member states. The represen-
tatives of the member states of the EEC of course found that this method was
2
"strictly in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV."
Most members of the competent sub-group felt, however, ''that an automatic
application of a formula, whether arithmetic average or otherwise, could not
be accepted, and agreed that the matter should be approached by examining in~
3
dividual commodities on a country by country basis."
This problem was not solved then. Nor was it at a later dates whether in the
examination of the Rome Treaty nor any other regional agreement. With regard
to the EEC it lost most of its importance on account of alter tariff reductions
so that now there can be little doubt that the Community in elaborating the
Common Tariff conformed to the provisions of paragraph 5 (a) of Article XXIV.
The same is true with regard to the "plan and schedule" for the formation of a
customs union contained in the EEC Treaty; since in the meantime it has been
implemented practically as laid down in the treaty» and within the time fore-
seen. It is to be noted, however, that at the time of the GATT examination, the
plan for the elimination of trade barriers among the member states of the Commun-
ity was regarded by some delegations as insufficient, since it did not contain
a precise time-table for the last stage of the transitional period. This is
remarkable because it shows that the Contracting Parties had, in this first big
case., very detailed expectations as to the precision of such a time-table in an
interim agreement. I wish to underline this as a contrast to later deliberations
of the Contracting Parties in analogue situations. In my opinion the growing
leniency of the GATT in this matter (as well as in others) is symptomatic for
either an increasing sympathy for regional arrangements, or of a decreasing
valuation of MFN treatment, or both. This also means, in continuation of our
analysis of the GATT-conforraity of the Rome Treaty, that, under present standards
there could be no reasonable doubt about the sufficiency of the plans and sche-
dules under paragraph 5(c).
To be precise: the tariffs of the member customs territories, the Benelux coun-
tries being one customs territory.
2 GATT, BISD, Sixth Suppl., p.72.
3 Ibid.
4
The similar question arising after the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom is probably to be answered in the same way although some issues
are not yet settled.- 37 -
The next important controversy fell under the competence of sub-group li and con-
cerned quantitative restrictions. This was one of the two matters dealt with
in paragraph 5 (a). The first, "duties",, although not solved but settled by
sub-group A left to be considered the seconds
 !lother regulations". They had
according to the norm, '
son the whole" not to be more restrictive than the
former regulations of the member states of the EEC. This was, however, feared
by the sub-group insofar as the Rome Treaty envisages the introduction of common
quotas instead of the quotas of the different member states. In particular they
expected that 'the effect of such an arrangement would be that some country or
countries in the union would be imposing quantitative restrictions not required
by their own balance of payments position and would, therefore, be raising barri-
ers to trade with other contracting parties."
Although nothing of this kind has happened up to now in the history of the EEC s
the argument had some merits at that time as well as for a possible future si-
tuation. It iss however, open to question how a customs union intended to de-
velop into an economic union could possibly work otherwise. But there is no
mention of an economic union in the GATT, understandably perhaps, since the
General Agreement deals only with (tariffs and) trade. This means,that the con-
struction of an economic and monetary union could possibly be considered illegal
if it required common quantitative restrictions imposed for balance of payments
purposes which might be an additional burden for the trade relations with third
countries, and therefore, not tolerated under the GATT.
Of courses this is not necessarily so. Perhaps the solidarity of an economic
and monetary union might make it possible for a member country which would
otherwise have resorted to balance of payments restrictions to get along now
without these because of the assistance from the partners of the economic and
monetary union. Therefore, the question of whether the incidence of quantitative
restrictions after the formation of the union is more onerous than before cannot
be decided generally, as long as the provision of the treaty founding the union
1 GATT, BISD, Sixth Supplement, p.79.- 38 -
provides only for a
 !'communalization
w but not obviously for an intensification
of quantitative restrictions. The latter was not done in the EEC-treaty. Sos in
my opinion, it cannot and could not be said that with regard to quantitative
restrbtions the Treaty violated the 'other regulations" part of paragraph 5(a)
of Article XXIV.
In this connection it is appropriate to raise the question as to who has to bear
the burden of proof. The text of paragraph 5(a) and the general rules of law
seem to imply that this burden is on the parties forming a customs union: he
who wants to make use of an exception has to prove that the conditions of the
exception are fulfilled. A lawyer might be inclined to follow this line. But is
that correct in view of paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which recognizes the 'de-
sirability of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements
11?
I do not think it is. In my opinion., this formulation makes it quite clear that
as a rule regional arrangements are desirable. Bearing in mind the general
aims of the GATT, this does imply that, as a rule, and on average, such arrange-
ments are expected to further international trade. Ifs however, a customs union
(or a free trade area, as well) raises, on balance, more barriers to trade than
it lowers^ that must be regarded as an exception from the rule and, consequently
ought to be proved. This means that the burden of proof rests with the Contract-
ing Parties. It means additionally that if such proof fails during the examina-
tion of the provisions of the agreement} and in case of doubt, the arrangement
in question is to be accepted.
Probably, this sounds rather formally legalistics and it is, as the rules re-
garding the burden of proof almost necessarily must be. But we still have the
possibility of arguing in another way, i.e. in a teleological way. This would
oblige us to find out what is the purpose of setting up rules for the formation
of customs unions and free trade areas and, especially, of interim agreements
for the construction of such groupings.- 39 -
One can safely start from the supposition that the rules containing the re-
quirements for an interim agreement do not have the purpose of making customs
union or free-trade areas impossible. If, however, an admissible interim
agreement must be constructed so as to remove any doubt that either duties or
other regulations would (or could be in the future) more onerous to trade
with third countries than the old duties or regulations of the member states,
then the required perfection could never be reacheds if only because the future
developments are rather difficult to foresee. It can, therefore, only be re-
quired that the agreement should not give rise to serious doubts in this direc-
tion. If there are such doubts, they need be substantiated which;, again, means
that without evidence to the contrary an interim agreement must be regarded as
conforming to the aims of the GATT. And, to be sure, in the beginning there will
almost certainly be an interim agreement, because the construction of a customs
union or a free-trade area can only exceptionally be completed at one single
stroke.
This was, of course, another legalistic construction, but now we have two of them
which might - just might - sound rather convincing. At least, it is to be hoped
that they are as convincing as the statistical and mathematical exercises which
are made in the hope of showing one or another regional grouping facilitates
trade between the member countries more than it hinders the trade of these coun-
tries with the outside world.
Buts according to plan we shall come back to this problem again. For the time
being, and for the reasons stated I am inclined to justify customs unions, free-
trade areas and the Economic Community with regard to the incidence of common
quantitative restrictions as compared with the former national ones - if the
examining party, sub-group, experts, etc. cannot prove that they will hinder
trade with their countries more than they further trade among the member states.
Obviously the sub-group in 1958 could not do that. No wonder, since they felt
:lin view of the uncertainties about the way in which the provisions of the Rome
Treaty would be implemented ... that at this stage it was not possible to make
a judgement that the application of the provisions of the Rome Treaty concern--40 -
ing the use of quantitative restrictions would or would not be compatible with
the relevant provisions of the General Agreement."
The solution offered by the sub-group was 'the closest possible cooperation',
not, howevers "any special consultation proc
- in agreement with the examining sub-group.
3
not, howevers "any special consultation procedures", which the Six had rejected
Unfortunately, in view of the complexity of the matter, it is quite impossible
to deal here at any length with the third subject of the GATT examination:
the agricultural policy of the Community. Only as a statement it may be noted
that in pre-EEC-times each one of the member states had had an agricultural
policy which had little to do with free international trade but did not nece-
ssarily discriminate between the foreign suppliers. Something similar is, it
seems to me, true for the common agricultural policys so that discrimination was
not seriously intensified. Whether the regulations of the EEC as a whole are more
restrictive than were the regulations of all individual member states put toge-
ther is doubtful, especially if we take into account that they (most probably)
have contributed to intensifying agricultural trade within the Community. And,
although many people tend to condemn the CAP for various reasons, it hardly re-
stricted trade with the outside world per saldo more th^n it facilitated trade
with agricultural products among the member states of the EEC. So, since this
is the criterion, and given the benefit of the doubt, CAP seems to be compatible
with paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV GATT.
Here, we may leave the EEC, although in 1958 the association with the overseas
countries and territories was also examined at the same time. This should, how-
ever, be treated separately, because the association can no longer be regarded as
a part of the Rome Treaty as it was in 1958.
GATT, BISD, Sixth Supplement, p.81.
2 Ibid.
Ibid., p.80.- 41 -
With regard to the EEC proper we come to the conclusion that on legal grounds
with the necessary consideration of economic arguments the Community conforms
to the rules laid down in Article XXIV GATT to a sufficient extent.
The European Free-Trade Association
Having already made some principal remarks in connection with the EEC should
facilitate the task of analysing EFTA. Moreover, since it is a free-trade area,
one problem is avoided which played a considerable role in the examination of
the EEC; that of the incidence of the Common External Tariff.
On the other hands a problem proper to the free-trade area, plagued the Contrac-
ting Parties in their examination of EFTA in 1960, that is^ the rules of origin
which are part of the Stockholm Convention. It was feared that
 :'highly technical
process criteria and the requirements of the origin rules could give rise to
practical difficulties which could adversely affect the trade of third countries.'
Rules of origin ares however, necessary for a free-trade area an account of
its different duty rates and trade regulations. They are even practically pre-
scribed by the GATT itself if they concern products imported under a preferential
3
system - as in the case of Commonwealth imports in the United Kingdom.
So the question to be decided was whether the rules of origin of EFTAS though
necessary3 were as liberal as possible under these circumstances. And the re-
port says: "It was generally felt that the rules of origin laid down by the
Convention were, on balance, reasonable."
With regard to quantitative restrictions, problems were considered which were
somewhat similar to those analysed in connection with the EEC. At first glance
surprisingly, even the question of quantitative restrictions for balance of pay-
Report in GATT, BISD, Nineth Supplement, p.70 et seq.
2 GATT, BISD, Ibid., p.71.
3
See "Notes and Supplementary Provisions", and Article CCIV para. 9.
4 GATT, BISD, 9th Suppl., p.73.ments purposes was considered although one might expect the balance of payments
situation of the member states of a free-trade area scarcely to be as much in-
fluenced by the formation of the regional grouping as that of the number of a
customs union. But also in the case of EFTA it was asked whether there could
be a "justification for imposing restrictions on imports from third countries
while not restricting imports from member states." The EFTA countries answerec
the question in the affirmative and rightly sos even according to the rules of
GATT, which allow import restrictions within a free-trade area (and a customs
,2
union) only "where necessary."
This remark points to another difficulty the EFTA countries had during the
examination of the Stockholm Convention. The ban on trade restrictions within
a regional grouping has the same source as the demand that substantially all
trade among the member states it to be liberalized. Both rules have the purpose
of guaranteeing that a free-trade area is not just a preferential arrangement
with regard to some instruments of commercial policy and with regard to some
products. The question of product coverages however, was one of the weak points
of the EFTA Convention, because in Article 21 it practically excluded agricul-
tural products from the free-trade regulations. Things were not made much better
by the fact that, in accord with the Stockholm Convention, some bilateral agree-
ments between EFTA states had been concluded in order to facilitate agricultual
trade. "It was pointed out in the Working Party that only in the case of very
few products was there a provision for the removal of tariffs in the bilateral
agreements and that, in each case, the removal was only to be effected by
3
one member state." The EFTA countries not only found this quite in order,but
they felt justified "in including, when estimating the total amount of trade
freed from barriers within the area, the amount of trade from which barriers
had been removed as a result of the bilateral agreements."
1 Ibid., p.77.
2 Art. XXIV para. 8(b) GATT.
GATT, BISD, 9th Suppl.s p.80.
4 Ibid., p.81.43 -
Although this 'amount of trade" was rather insignificant the argument was quite
important since it was intended to prove that at least some trade with agricul-
tural products was covered by the Stockholm Convention so that it was not "a
whole sector" which was excluded. In my opinion (1.) such an argumentation is
rather sophistics (2.) the bilateral agreements are difficult to reconcile with
Article XXIV GATT, and (3.) the Stockholm Convention would be "GATT conform" even
if limited to industrial products.
The first point may be regarded as a statement of opinion. As to the second it
may suffice to state that, presumably liberalization of "trade between the con-
stituent territories ' means trade between all,, and not just two of them} even
if a semblance of intra-region MFN treatment is accorded by the country making a
concession. There remains the third point. It is illustrated by a statement to
the contrary made by members of the Working Partyi "It was also contended that
the phrase 'substantially all the trade' had a qualitative as well as a quan-
titative aspect and that it should not be taken as allowing the exclusion of a
major sector of econmic activity. For this reason, the percentage of trade covered
even if it were established to be 90 percent, was not considered to be the only
factor to be taken into account."
GATTS BISD, 9th Suppl., p.83.- 44 -
Testing this argument, one must ask where in Article XXIV that qualitative aspect
is to be found. I can see no reason why the exclusion of products from different
sectors should be preferable to the exclusion of most products of one sector. With
regard to the question of whether 90 percent of trade is enough to qualify for the
title "substantially all
1' I may refer to my former argument that the founders of
a regional grouping have the benefit of the doubt in their favour. If this is so,
90 percent seems to be rather close to "substantially all".
So, if I have to give an opinion on whether the EFTA is a free-trade area accor-
ding to Article XXIV GATT9 the answer will be positive. It would not change if all
agricultural products were excluded from EFTA treatments since the EFTA trade with
2 these products is so small that the rest will remain "substantially all" trade.
The bilateral agreements on trade with agricultural products can, however, hardly
be reconciled with Article XXIV GATT.
As a conclusion, it is to be noted that the opinion of the Contracting Parties
was divided, and that they? therefore, left things undecided. In their "Conclusion;
adopted on 18 November 1960 they stated: "(c) The Contracting Parties feel that
there remain some legal and practical issues which would not be fruitfully dis-
cussed further at this stage. Accordingly, the Contracting Parties do not find it
appropriate to make recommendations to the parties to the Convention pursuant to
paragraph 7(b) of Article XXIV. (d) This conclusion clearly does not prejudice the
3
rights of the Contracting Parties under Article XXIV."
The Latin American Free-Trade Area
When discussing the LAFTA it seems interesting to point to some important diffe-
rences in the "Conclusion" of the Contracting Parties. With regard to the Latin
4
American Free-Trade Area, letters (c) and (d) have the following text:
In the form (and with the members) it had when it was examined by the Contracting
Parties of GATT. This precautionary limitation might be unnecessary, since I fine
no apparent reason why things should have changed in this respect on account of
the withdrawal of Denmark and the UK from EFTA.
2
It has become still less since Denmark and the UK lsft EFTA.
3 GATT, BISD, 9th Suppl., p.20.
4 Ibid., p.21. (Italics added).- 45 -
!(c) At this stage of their examination the Contracting Parties
feel that there remain some questions of a legal and prac-
tical nature which it would be difficult to settle solely
on the basis of the text of the Treaty and that these
questions could be more fruitfully discussed in the light
of the application of the Montevideo Treaty. For these reasons
the Contracting Parties do not at this juncture find it appro-
priate to make recommendations to the parties to the Treaty
pursuant to paragraph 7(b) of Article XXIV.
(d) This conclusion clearly does not prejudice the rights con-
ferred on the Contracting Parties under Article XXIV and
does not in any way prevent the parties to the Montevideo
Treaty from proceeding with the application of that Treaty
when it has been ratified."
So, contrary to their conclusion in the EFTA case, the Contracting Parties in the
LAFTA case felt that they could not judge the regional arrangement solely on the
basis of the Treaty, but that they mast wait for the outcome of its practical
application. Consequently, the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty were told
to go ahead, irrespective of the deliberations and the findings of the Working
Party.
With regard to these findings, some peculiarities are to be noted. The following
are cited mostly in the phraseology of the report:
The Working Party noted that the tariff reductions would not be linear in nature,
but might differ according to products.
The member States declared that it was impossible to indicate at present the
products in respect of which customs duties would not have been abolished at the
end of the transitional period.
GATT, BISD, 9th SuppL, pp.88 et seq.- 46 -
Explanations were requested concerning the compensation regime (payments in
goods) in force in Mexico.
With regard to the effects of the Treaty on the system of selling foreign curren-
cy by auction, as practised in Brazil, it was explained that the Treaty did not
deal specifically with the system.
The member states indicated that the individual signatories were allowed every
latitude concerning the choice of the products on which negotiations were to be
undertaken each year, subject only to the condition that the sum fo the annual
reductions should not be less than 8 percent of the weighted average.
The Working Party expressed concern over the documentation requirements with
respect to import from third countries.
The Working Party expressed certain misgivings regarding the absence of a more
precise schedule for trade liberalization.
The Working Party was advised that escape clauses had been written into the
Treaty in order to take into account the special situation of the less-developed
countries within the Area and of the balance of payments difficulties which
member states might experience.
The Working Party noted that the systems of prior deposits in force in the
member states were a type of restriction to trade and any move to eliminate prior
deposit requirements would be most welcome.
The Working Party asked for elucidation of the wording of Article 29 of the Treat:
referring to a priority to be given to products originating in the territories
of other member states of the Area, which might imply discrimination against
third countries.Member states indicated that it was the intention of the signatories to the Treaty
to enter into long-term agreements or into quantitative agreements which would
both provide the exporting country with the assurance of a stable market and the
importing country with a definite possibility of securing quality products at
international prices.
Considering all these findings it is difficult to reconcile the Treaty of Monte-
video with any of the legal requirements of a free-trade area elaborated above.
It was therefore rather benevolent that the Working Party found that it "could
be considered by the Contracting Parties under the procedures relating to interim
agreements leading to the formation of a free-trade area in the sense of Article
XXIV", even though the sentence began with the word ''only'
1. To be sure, they did
so in spite of those "misgivings regarding the absence of a more precise schedule
for trade liberalization" and without some reliable knowledge as to what "sub-
stantial" part of trade between the member states would be liberalized. Since
the Montevideo Treaty rather clearly failed these tests it could9 from a legal
point of views hardly be brought under Article XXIV, even as an interim agreement.
Recognizing this does not imply that the endeavour of the signatories of the LAFTi
Treaty was wrong and that the Contracting Parties were ill advised to wish them
well. But was it really necessary to pretend that the prerequisites of one of the
Article XXIV arrangements were fulfilled? In order to deal with this question
some more evidence may be useful. Let us go on to the association of Turkey with
the European Economic Community.
Association EEC /Turkey
The Agreement creating an association between the European Economic Community
and Turkey, presented to the Contracting Parties of the GATT as an interim agree
ment leading to the formation of a customs union, was first examined by a GATT
Working Party in 1964. It is not only of special interest because it is a
Report in GATT, BISD, 13th Suppl., pp. 59 et seq.~ 48 -
regional arrangement between a group of industrialized countries (the EEC) and
one developing country but alsos because it is intended to bring about a customs
union, i.e. the closer grouping of the two envisaged in Article XXIV GATT.Another
feature of a technical nature is worth noting, too: the association was examined
again by a GATT Working Party in 1972 thus pres<
the progress made in the past eight year period.
again by a GATT Working Party in 1972 thus presenting an opportunity to evaluate
In the 1964 review the Agreement met with the objection that it contained no
sufficient plan and schedule for the formation of the proposed customs union
since the time-table was only related to the preparatory stage. Moreover, the
period envisaged for the construction of the customs union which is (about) 22
years, was regarded by some members of the Working Party as too long - not "rea-
sonable" in the sense of paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV GATT. Another point ex-
pressly noted was that the Agreement has a largely unilateral character9 by far
the biggest concessions being made by the EEC. This point, for one, was clearly
conceded by the partners of the Agreement, and justified with the very different
levels of economic development in Turkey and the EEC.
The outcome of the GATT examination is not surprising in view of the conclusions
of the previously cited cases. Since the parties to the Agreement as well as one
other member of (he Working Party were of the opinion that both the ''plan and
schedule" was sufficient and the length of the transitional period "reasonable"
under the circumstances given, the Working Party proposed no decision and confined
'its report to recording the information, classifications and arguments which have
2
been put forward.''
During the 1972 examination of the association Agreement some members of the
Working Party still did not regard the time period envisaged for the formation of
the customs union as "reasonable". Probably with a view to the "substantially-all-
Ibid., 19th Suppl., pp.102 et seq.
2 GATT, BISD3 13th Suppl., p.64.49 ~
trade" requirements the "lack of a sufficient commitment to incorporate Turkey's
agricultural exports into the liberalization process was also noted."
On the whole, however, the opinion of the Working Party with respect to the Agree-
ment seemed to have been more sympathetic than in 1964. All members stated "that
they favour closer economic ties between Turkey and the European Economic Community
and recognized that the main objective of the Association, which is to establish
a full customs union5 is in conformity with the fundamental objection of the
2
General Agreement."
This verdict is supported by the fact that between 1964 and 1972 a considerable
progress in the direction of "closer ties
5
1 was registered. In comparison the ob-
jections noted seem to be of minor importance. At least they are, in my opinion,
not as grave as to violate the rather vage norms regarding the contents of an
interim agreement such as that between the EEC and Turkey.
Association EEC / African States
Just like the Association EEC/Turkey, the Association between the Community and
the African and Malagasy States (AMS) was repeatedly examined by the Contracting
Parties of the GATT. In this case even three such surveys took place, the first
3
in 1958 when the whofe EEC Treaty was considered, the second m 1966 after the con-
clusion of the Convention of Yaounde, and the third in 1970 dealing with the
second Convention of Yaounde.
Since the first Association, being part of the Rome Treaty and dealing with the
relationship to not yet independent countries and territories, was' no genuine
integration "agreement" it is only of some historical interest here. It met with
1 Ibid., 19th Suppl., p. 104
2 GATT, BISDS 19th Suppl., p.108.
3
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considerable resistance in the GATT, and it was even reported - a unique event -
'that a majority had advanced the view that the association of the overseas
territories under the Treaty was not consistent with the provisions of Article
XXIV of the General Agreement.
;
(
In the discussion of the first Yaounde Convention some members of the Working
Party stated that in their opinion Article XXIV had "never been meant to apply
to free-trade or customs union arrangements between developed and less developed
countries." This view was, of course, rejected by the parties to the Yaounde
Convention with the remark that nothing of this kind was written into the artile.
Apart from this and some other subjects of a more general character, the dis-
cussion concentrated on the three well-known topics: it was objected that not
2
"substantially all" trade was covered. According to some members of the Working
Party the Convention did not meet the requirement that its tariffs and other
restrictions "should not be higher than the equivalent measures in force prior
3 to the formation of the area." Finally, it was observed that
 [fthe requirements
of a plan and schedule had not been complied with." Not surprisingly, the
representatives of the EEC and the AMS expressed quite different opinions,
and the Contracting Parties were content to "note the diverging views which
exist."
6
When the second Yaounde Convention was under consideration in the GATT, a new
objection was raised. A member of the Working Party noted that "the elimination
of customs duties on imports from the Community was followed by an increase in
other charges on imports from all sources, including the Community, by roughly s.
similar amount." While they did not (and in fact could not) deny this, the




For a summary see ibid., p.110.
6 Ibid.s p.22.
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parties to the Yaounde Convention claimed that the new charges were fiscal
charges and that the "elimination of fiscal charges had never yet constituted




This view seems to have prevailed,, since the Working Party stated in its
conclusions that progress in respect of the elimination of duties and re-
strictions between the constituent territories had been made. Under these
circumstances it regarded free-trade areas between the EEC and the eighteen
Associated States as sufficiently established. "It noted that while some
members had expressed doubt about particular provisions of the Convention they
had not expressed the view that the basic requirements of Article XXIV: 3(b)
2 had not been met.
1'
Indeed, if apart from the dubious fiscal charges9 free trade between the EEC and
the AMS is established, the old controversy with regard to the "plans and sche-
dules'
5 and the ''reasonable time" is eliminated for then it is no longer an
interim agreement but a free-trade area (or several free-trade areas) which is
under consideration.
Agreement EEC / Spain
The agreement of the EEC with Spain which, imprudently enough> in Community
circles is called a "preference agreement" was presented to the Contracting
Parties of the GATT as an arrangement under Article XXIV. Although the parties
expressly undertook to eliminate the barriers to substantially all of their
mutual trades they planned to do so in two steps and laid down a time-table
only for the first stages during which trade barriers were to be lowered by
certain percentages. This gave rise, of course, to the well-known objections
that the agreement could not qualify as an interim agreement according to
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The representatives of the EEC and of Spain found, however9 surprisingly great
understanding for their argument that it would not have "been realistic to fix
already from the outset a detailed and complete plan and schedule for the achieve-
ment of free trade. More detailed and complete provisions would instead be
established in due course taking into account the experiences gained in the first
stage."
1
If this statement was accepted, there was not much left to be examined, and no
great choice open but to admit that the agreement was an arrangement under para-
graph 5 (c) of Article XXIV. If the "plans and schedules" need neither contain
the details for the whole path of the free-trade area or customs union, respecti-
vely, nor provide for a time-limit, then the only requirement left for the
acceptance as an interim agreement under Article XXIV is a declaration that it is
intended to eliminate the barriers to substantially all trade between the parties
within a reasonable time.
In the case of Spain, however, a new argument was presented and, as it appears,
widely accepted. Referring to the "geographical and political context in which
the agreement was situated" some members of the Working Party were prepared "to
take a dynamic view" and were "confident that Spain had already attained a
sufficient degree of economic development to enable the parties in time to
organize their relations in a way that would increasingly approximate a free-
2
trade area".
Somewhat reluctantly, I tend to support this reasoning, which means in essence
that every case should be jugded according to its particular circumstances. If
such a pragmatic approach leads to a new interpretation of what the "plans and
schedules" according to paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should contain, this is
not excluded by the wording. It might even be more conform with the spirit of
the article than the presentation and acceptation of a time-table full of escape
clauses or, worse, an apparently illusionary one.
1 GATT, BISD, 13th Suppl., p.171.
2 Ibid., p. 169.- 53 -
The legal significance of Art. XXIV GATT and its
application: Conclusions
Although there are several other regional arrangements for which the member
states have claimed Article XXIV status , I think there is now enough material
which allows to form a solidly founded opinion on the legal significance of
Article XXIV and the practice of its application.
One of the most remarkable results of our survey is that not a single one of
the regional arrangements reviewed has been formally accepted by the Contrac-
ting Parties as an enterprise conforming to the norms laid down in Article
ZXIV. This means that in any case some members of the highest institution of
GATT had unsurmountable doubts that the grouping surveyed conformed to the
letter of the Article.
I have stressed that I do not share this opinion. Neither in the case of the
European Economic Community nor in that of the European Free Trade Area are
the remaining doubts grave enough to reject the claim to the status of a
customs union or free-trade area under Article XXIV respectively. Only a very
idealistic purist could regard more conformity to the letter of the Article
as indispensable, although certainly some of the criticism voiced is worth
serious consideration.
Equally, with regard to some other regional groupings I think that they -
not completely but to a decisive degree - conform to the requirements for
interim agreements according to paragraph 5(c). I have not concealed that
there are grave doubts, especially as to their chance of becoming "final"
free-trade areas and to the methods applied or contemplated during the interim
period, as well as to whether this period can be regarded as "reasonable".
But since the criteria laid down in Article XXIV in this regard are so vague,
they leave so much discretion that the associations of the EEC with Turkey
and with the associated African States and Madagaskar, and even the agreement
Some are very similar to the ones which have been discussed, especially the
associations and other agreements of the EEC with countries in the Mediterr-
anean Area.- 54 -
of the Community with Spain need not, on legal grounds, be refused the status
of paragraph 5(c). There is in no case a clear and indisputable violation of
any of the legal requirements. Due to the indistinct formulation of precisely
these requirements, there is, on the other hand, a wide range of possible
violations. But mere possibilities do not suffice to reject the claim to Arti-
cle XXIV status as long as it is only doubtful, whether the agreement in
question conforms to the norm of the GATT, the legality is to be assumed.
This is, of course, the crucial point. I may, therefore, repeat that in my
opinion the GATT regards regional integration as desirable, if some basic
requirements are met. Only if it can be proven that they are not met, the
claim can and must be rejected. This follows from the text and from the
purpose of paragraph 4 of Article XXIV. It has, in the meantime, also been
tacitly recognized as "GATT custom", since none of the regional arrangements
brought before the Contracting Parties has been rejected. Even in one of the
most dubious, that of LAFTA, the member states have been told to go on with
the measures envisaged, which are clearly discriminating against the other
contracting parties of GATT, but justified only if they are covered by
Article XXIV.
As will be remembered, LAFTA is the only case in which I am of the opinion
that the requirements of Article XXIV are not met, so that it should have
been rejected on legal grounds. This is so, because the product coverage fore-
seen is so imprecise and small and the procedure and the length of the interim
period are so undefined that even with a most generous interpretation it could
neither be claimed that "substantially all trade" is covered nor that the
formation of a free trade area will be completed "within a reasonable length
of time."
This result, that LAFTA fails while the other arrangements pass, is not at all
satisfying. As it turned out, the failure on the one hand and the successes
on the other depended largely on the presentation of the cases. Declarations
of intent often suffice. Escape clauses are allowed, "transitory" exceptions
as well. And what the outcome of the arrangement in question will really be.- 55 -
cannot be foreseen. The fact is that cleverness in the formulation of an
agreement should be decisive is, however, though not at all uncommon in
legal practice, scarcely a result worthy of such an important matter as re-
gional integration.
The way out of this dilemma is, of course, to reform Article XXIV GATT. Such
a reform is on its way. The review of some Article XXIV cases in the previous
section showed a distinct development of the international practice with re-
gard to regional groupings, from rather vigorous standards in 1957 to a very
great leniency in 1972. So, if one applies GATT law as it has been developed
by the practice of working parties, up to the year 1972, LAFTA should now
pass the test as an interim agreement according to paragraph 5(c), too.
To be sure, this leaves us with a state of law with regard to the Article
XXIV exceptions from most-favoured-nation treatment that sanctions practi-
cally everything presented under the heading of a customs union, a free trade
area, or an interim agreement. One is inclined to ask: so what ? This is the
state of affairs anyway. Let us do away with rules which only serve the pur-
pose of testing inventiveness of international lawyers and which are only
paid lip service or are even openly ignored. The only question is whether
they should be abolished entirely or substituted by more appropriate norms.
This is where the suggestion of Kenneth Dam comes in, to apply a test pro-
vided by economic theory. Let us recall this seemingly simple test: if a
regional arrangement is predominatly trade creating it is welcome and worth
being sanctioned by Article XXIV. If it is predominantly trade diverting, it
should be rejected, and the partner states have to abide by the MFN rule.
The only pity is that the proposed test 1. as yet does not work satisfactori-
ly, 2.if it worked, would not be very illuminating as to the value of a
regional arrangement, and 3.in GATT practice, would only replace the inven-
tiveness of the international laywer by that of the statistician or the
econometrist.- 56 -
As to point 1, it is no secret that, although numerous attempts to measure
trade creation or trade diversion have been made, the methods to be applied
are still in a stage of experiment and the results obtained far from con-
vincing.
Second, such a test could not say much about the value of a proposed
regional economic agreement, since as yet no satisfactory way has been found
to predict and take into consideration future developments and dynamic factors.
On account of these factors, thirdly, the examination of a proposed regional
arrangement would take the form of a competition between the experts presen-
ted by the different parties. Since, under these circumstances, no unequivocal
result can be expected, the outcome would most probably be the same as that of
the as yet habitual competitions between international lawyers: "The Contrac-
ting Parties note that the Working Party confined itself to recording infor-
mation, arguments and clarifications put forward by governments, but they do
not find it desirable to pursue at this time an examination of the issues raised
in the Working Party and, in the light of further opportunities for conside-
ration under the General Agreement, do not at this stage avail themselbes of
the possibility of addressing recommendations under Article XXIV: 7 to the
parties of the Agreement".
No further device is known to test the value of a regional arrangement imparti-
ally. So,we have to get along without a test. This leaves us with the alter-
native of abolishing the exception from MFN treatment in favour of regional
arrangements altogether or to accept such arrangements more or less on good
faith. Apparently, the first course is not open. It would be highly unrealistic
to suppose that the existing customs unions, free-trade areas etc. will be
abolished and that the contracting parties to the GATT will commit themselves
to refrain from forming such groupings in the future.
Taken from the conclusions adopted on 15 November 1962 with regard to
the Association of Greece with the EEC. GATT, BISD, 11th Suppl. p.57.- 57 -
The second course can be taken, and for all practical purpose is already
taken. So I propose to sanction it and change the rule of Article XXIV GATT
in an appropriate way. Regional groupings are to be tolerated. They should
endeavour to as much liberalization in as short a time as possible. But
complete elimination of the barriers to mutual trade need not necessarily be
attained. This would do away with norms which are circumvented anyhow. Such
a return to honesty might, on the other hand, open an opportunity to replace
the sham initial test by a continual review practice.
In oder to achieve this, agreements on regional economic groupings are to be
submitted to the Contracting Parties for consultation. At regular inter-
vals reports on their activities with special reference to their influence
on the trade with the other members of GATT are to be made. Following these
reports there should be an examination, perhaps on the lines of the "country
examinations" which are practised in the OECD, preferably with concluding re-
commendations by the Contracting Parties to the member states of the regional
grouping in question. Further, a complaints procedure could be envisaged,
which gives GATT members who are harmed by the activities of a regional or-
ganization the possibility to instigate an investigation by the Contracting
Parties. It need not even be entirely Utopian to think of a judicial procedure.
§
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Apart from paragraph 2 and 3 of Article I and from Article XXIV there is only
one further norm of the General Agreement which was expressly designed to
sanction exceptions to the rules of non-discrimination. That is Article XXV,
which allows under certain circumstances discriminations in the application
of quantitative restrictions for balance of payments or development purposes.
Some other provisions of the GATT may, among other purposes, offer a basis
for deviations from the MFN-rule: Article XX which deals with the General
Exceptions to protect public morals, health, scarce natural resources etc.,
Article XXI, which contains the Security Exceptions, Article XXXV dealing with
the non-application of the Agreement between particular Contracting Parties,
Article XXIII, which describes the Nullification and Impairment procedure,
and Article XXV. From the GATT provisions just cited, this last one has had
by far the greatest importance as a basis for exceptions from MFN treatment.- 58 -
Therefore, it will be dealt with at some length.
According to paragraph 5 of Article XXV the Contracting Parties may authorize
a signatory state, a group of signatory states, or all of them, to.deviate
from one or some obligations of the General Agreement.
"In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in
this Agreement, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation im-
posed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any
such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half
of the contracting parties ... "
Because of the expression "waive", which is used in the paragraph, this
power of the Coiiracting Parties has become widely known as the "waiver power".
It has been used extensively and the obligations waived are numerous. With
regard to exceptions from the MFN rule an outstanding example is the waiver
according to which the United States "is free to eliminate the customs duties
at present imposed on automative products of Canada without being required to




The basis for this waiver was an agreement between the US and Canada which
provided for duty-free treatment for their mutual trade in automative pro-
ducts. The Contracting Parties "considered" that the close similarity of
market conditions offered "exceptional opportunities" to rationalize produc-
tion, to integrate productions facilities and to increase efficiency. They
considered, further, that the government of the United States had no inten-
tion to replace imports from other sources by those of Canada. In order to
Many cases concern import surcharges for balance of payments reasons.
2
Decision of 20 December 1965. GATT, BISD, 14th Suppl., p.37. A rather im-
pressive "list of automative products referred to in the waiver" is re-
produced as annex to the decision. Ibid., p.39.- 59 -
safeguard the interests of other members of the GATT, however,paragraph 2 of
the decision established a consultation procedure:
"The Government of the United States shall enter into
consultation with any contracting party that requests
consultation on the grounds (i) that it has a substan-
tial interest in the trade in an automative product in
the United States market, and (ii) that the elimination
of customs duties by the United States on imports of that
automative product from Canada has created, or imminently
threatens to create, a significant diversion of imports of
that automative product from the requesting contracting
party to imports from Canada."
If, during these consultations, the parties fail to reach an agreement, they
may refer the question to the Contracting Parties for decision. Moreover, the
waiver will be reviewed anyway, on the basis of annual reports to be supplied
by the United States.
A further important example for a waiver of the obligation to treat all GATT
partners on a MFN basis is that accorded to the European Coal and Steel
Community. Here, a vast range of goods is concerned, and, this time, there
are six partners to the agreement for which a waiver was necessary.
One might think in Ms case, that the ECSC Treaty concerned the formation of a
free-trade area for the coal and steel sectors, as indeed it is, Only a free-
trade area for one sector alone or even for some sectors, is not a free-trade
area in the sense of Article XXIV GATT. As will be remembered, such free-trade
areas in the legal sense must comprise "substantially all" trade between the
partners of the agreement. On this account the ECSC was no Article XXIV case
but, since it offended the MFN obligation, only admissible if a waiver was
given under the (harder) conditions of paragraph 5 Article XXV.
1 Decision of 10 November 1952. GATT, BISD, l
S
t suppl., p.17.- 60 -
The Contracting Parties gave such a waiver, which included the requirement,
that the Community should report annually on the progress made towards the
full application of the Treaty during the transitional period. Obviously, the
discussion of these reports proved satisfactory, for on occasion of the final
report at the end of the transitional period of the ECSC several members of the
GATT Committee "expressed their confidence that the spirit of co-operation
that had prevailed between the Member States and the Contracting Parties
2
would be maintained in the future."
The two cases just reviewed concerned agreements on closer trade relations
between industrialized states. A waiver granted to further the relationship
between less-developed countries (LDCs) is that sanctioning the mutual trade
arrangement between India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. This
case is of special interest insofar as the partner states of the agreement
can either be regarded as a "region", nor was the agreement intended to elimi-
nate the trade barriers completely nor for substantially all trade. The waive-r
was given in the hope that the mutual trade preferences might contribute to
the economic development of the three countries.
This brings us to one of the most important motives which are brought for-
ward to justify deviations from the MFN rule: the wish to further the economic
development of the LDCs. To this end these countries had elaborated a "Proto-
col relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries." The Protocol
was the subject of a decision of the Contracting Parties concerning "Trade
Negotiations among Developing Countries."
The purpose is stated quite clearly in the oping passages of the decision,
in which the Contracting Parties noted that they might "enable developing
Para.7 of the decision of 10 November 1952.
2 GATT, BISD, 7th Suppl., p.124.
3
Decision of 14 November 1968, GATT, BISD, 16th Supp., p.17.
4
This is the title of the GATT decision of 26 November 1971. GATT, BISDS
18th Suppl., p.26.- 61 -
contracting parties to use special measures to promote their trade and de-
velopment." They consider as one of these special measures, that the LDCs
grant expanding access to one another's markets on especially favourable
terms "through an exchange of tariff and trade concessions directed towards
the expansion of their mutual trade."
Since such preferences were intended to give LDCs better conditions than
the industrialized countries, they contradicted the MFN rule. Therefore3
a waiver was asked for and the Contracting Parties decided that
"the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General
Agreement shall be waived to the extent necessary to permit
each contracting party participating in the arrangements set
out in the Protocol ... to accord preferential treatment as
provided in the Protocol with respect to products originating
in other parties to the Protocol, without being required to
extend the same treatment to like goods when imported from
other Contracting Parties."
The waiver was given "provided that any such preferential treatment shall
be designed to facilitate trade between the participants and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties." A consultation and
complaints procedure and an annual review was provided for.
While this waiver allows the LDSs to give preferences to other less-developed
countries, a further waiver also sanctions preferences by industrialized
countries in favour of the LDSs. The subject of this waiver is the well-
known "Generalized System of Preferences" (GSP), which has been demanded by
the developing countries since the first United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. It was based on the argument that equal
2
treatment was non-discriminating only if it were applied to comparable cases.
This is also the title of the decision of the Contracting Parties dated 25
June 1971. GATT, BISD, 18th Suppl., p.24.
2
See the so-called Prebish-Report UN-Document E/Conf. 46/3 of 12 February
1964, and UNCTAD, Document TD/B/AC. 1/1 of 23 March 1965. For a discussion
of this question in international law see Kewenig, op.cit., p. 190 et seq.- 62 -
In unequal cases an adjusted treatment was called for in order to treat them
non-discriminatingly. From this point of view, MFN treatment was only non-
discriminating if applied by industrialized states on imports from industri-
alized states or by LDCs on imports from LDCs for that matter.
Following this argument, it was deduced that LDCs, being in an economically
underprivileged position, were entitled to preferential treatment. Hence
the demand for customs preferences. After long debates lasting seven years,
the demand was accepted, not on account of the argumentation mentioned, but
as a means to aid the development of the LDCs.
As noted in the preamble to the decision of the Contracting Parties, mutually
acceptable arrangements had been drawn up in the UNCTAD "concerning the
establishment of generalized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal preferential
tariff treatment in the market of developed countries for products origina-
ting in developing countries."
In order to bring such a Generalized System of Preferences in accord with the
GATT the Contracting Parties waived the MFN obligation for a period of ten
years, provided that "any such preferential tariff arrangements shall be de-
signed to facilitate trade from developing countries and territories and not
to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties." Further con-
ditions of the waiver were that the Contracting Parties are furnished "with
all useful information relating to the actions taken pursuant to the present
Decisions," that opportunities for consultation are given, and that complaints
may be brought before the Contracting Parties which will examine them "prompt"
ly and will formulate any recommendation that they judge appropriate."
With respect to the legal character of the GSP it should be mentioned that
they were not regarded, as the arguments recited above might indicate, as an
emanation of the principle of non-discrinination in the proposed sense as an
obligation to treat unequal cases differently. Instead, the waiver dealt with
"preferences" which were "beneficial to the developing countries in order to
increase export earnings, to promote industrialization, and to accelerate the
rates of economic growth" of the LDCs. They were treated as an exception from- 63 -
from Article I paragraph 1, limited in time, and subject to conditions. And
they are again, although limited to the group of LDCs, based on the MFN rule,
since they have to be non-discriminating within this group.
All these reviewed waivers of the MFN obligation are in a way typical in their
motivation and show that Article XXV exceptions cover a wide range of ground.
With regard to the volume of trade they concern important sectors of the
intra-Western European and the US-Canadian trade as well as all trade among
LDCs and all imports of industrialized countries from LDCs. To be sure, the
General System of Preferences has not yet been fully introduced, especially
by the United States, and the range of goods is neither complete nor are the
imports under the GSP unlimited. But an extension in any direction is not at
all unlikely and has already been demonstrated, to some extent, especially
by the EEC. So, if a possible future development is taken into account, the
portion of international trade which is exempted from MFN treatment by
Article XXV waivers, is quite considerable.
If we try to systemize the MFN waivers according to subjects we get the folow-
ing list:
1. Preferential agreements between neighbouring industrialized countries for
a limited range of goods
2. Preferential agreements between some LDCs for a limited range of goods
3. Preferential agreements among all less-developed countries for possibly
all goods
4. General preferences in favour of LDCs by all industrialized countries,
possibly covering all goods produced in the LDCs.
Although the exceptions sanctioned by these waivers are not yet fully used
and perhaps never will be, they legalize the exemption of all trade among
developing countries and all imports from developing countries from the MFN- 64 -
treatment. They legalize further some regional arrangements which apparently do
not comply with the requirements of Article XXIV GATT. If we take into tonside-
ration these "preferences" which are based on Article XXIV, we must add to the
legalized or at least tolerated exemptions from MFN treatment a big share of
the trade among the industrialized countries (viz. intra-EEC, intra-EFTA, inter
EEC/EFTA trade) and some reciprocal trade between industrialized and developing
countries (viz.trade between the EEC and associated and other LDCs in Africa and
the Mediterranean region).
Conclusions
This state of affairs opens, to put it mildly, serious doubts as to the general
application of the MFN rule in the GATT. The Contracting Parties have either le-
galized or tolerated a great number of exceptions and only some of the most im-
portant have been dealt with here. In addition, in GATT practice there can be noted
an increasing disregard or leniency, depending on the point of view, with regard
to the MFN rule. On the whole, it is now difficult to speak of a rule to which
there exist or are allowed exceptions. In fact} as the different examples given
should show, the MFN rule now only moderates or qualifies the overriding motives
of regional integration and of economic growth for the LDCs. In no case has the
rule in the end prevented exceptions based on these motives, although it may often
have given rise to detailed and thorough considerations, and to useful modifica-
tions of the original plans.
One could, of course, plead for a tough course in order to give to the MFN rule
the prominent place in the system of international trade it was originally in-
tended to have. Probably, in face of the erosion which already has taken place,
this would not be a very realistic course. Moreover, there are some doubts, whether
it would be the right one. The development during the last two decades can have,
and probably has corresponded to a need felt in the international community to
place stronger emphasis on regional integration and on aiding economic development
than might have been expected at the end of the Second World War, or, to be pre-
cise, than was included in the General Agreement "onTariffs and Trade".- 65 -
So, I think that not an attempt to rigorously apply the MFN rule is called for but
an attempt to use what is left of the principle of non-discrimination, if no
longer as a cornerstone,but as a safeguard for as much order in the international
trading system as possible.
For this purpose, one of the first things to do is to give back to the principle
of non-discrimination the "respectability" it has lost through many circumventions,
dubious interpretations, and outright violations. The way to do this is indicated
by the development which international practice has taken. Perhaps from a legalis-
tic point of view one could even argue that by means of this practice, the indi-
cated change has already happened, international custom which gives a diminished
value to MFN treatment already being established. Be that as it may, it is time
to recognize that the MFN rule should stand in the way of the formation of regional
groupings and of endeavours to aid the economic growth of less-developed countries,
provided that some conditions are accepted. These conditions are not necessarily
vague requirements like the ones in Article XXIV which, as we have been seen, gave
rise to so many controversies as to their real meaning but never prevented the
establishment of a regional grouping. Instead, they should lie in the field of
information, consultation, and complaints settlement, perhaps even adjudication.
This means isolating one of the aspects of multilateral MFN treatment which, as
has been demonstrated above, is of particular interest to thoa partner states
which generally or in a special case lack the bargaining power to impress on
strong partner states the need to consider their reactions. Certainly, in the
usual discussion, the rule of equal treatment and mutual surveillance are regard-
ed as a whole. But there is no necessity for always doing so. According to the
philosophy lying behind Article XXIV GATT, the establishment of regional groupings
is generally regarded as beneficial, not only to the member states themselves,but
to the international trading community as well.
We also found that this beneficial effect has been noted, even in legally rather
dubious groupings such as the association between the EEC and the AASM and in a
regional arrangement which certainly did not qualify as an Article XXIV group-
ing, the European Coal and Steel Community. To repeat, in the GATT report on the
second Yaounde agreement, the Working Party stated that during the previous- 66 -
period progress in the elimination of customs duties and restrictive regulations
of commerce between the partner states had been made. It noted further, "that no
specific cases of adverse effects to the trade of third countries had been raised.
And with regard to the ECSC the final report of the GATT Committee ended: "In
conclusion several members paid tribute to the appreciable progress recorded by
the Community in the past five years and expressed their confidence that the spirit
of co-operation that had prevailed between the Member States and the Contracting
2 Parties would be maintained in the future."
This is some conclusive evidence that deviations from the MFN rule in order to form
regional groupings of any kind are not necessarily resented by and may even arouse
positive comments from third countries, if a spirit of co-operation prevails so
that these countries can be sure that their interests are respected. To this end an
information-consultation-arbitration machinery is helpful or probably indispen-
sable.
With regard to deviations from the MFN rule in favour of the LDCs the argument runs
somewhat differently but leads to the same conclusion: Since the action is designed
to aid the economic growth of the developing nations some open and perceptible
discrimination against the industrialized states is intended. What is to be
avoided, however, is that real and unproportionately great harm is done to an
industry in one of these states. This should not only be avoided in the interest
of the country concerned but also in that of the LDCss for in such a case, escape
action from the part of the injured state is to be expected. Therefore, also in
this case, rather than to preserve MFN treatment, the desire of the "third" coun-
tries is directed towards an international procedure which insures that their
interests are guarded against serious damage.
So, what is primarily required is not the conservation or restoration of the MFN
rule of Article I GATT, but the conservation and possibly strengthening of the
international / multilateral surveilance of deviations from that rule. While the
1 GATT,, BISD, 18th Suppl.9 p. 142.
Ibid., 7th Suppl., p.124.- 67 -
international trading community may be lenient, and indeed is lenient, in allowing
exceptions from MFN treatment in favour of regional arrangements and in order to
aid economic development, a high degree of international surveillance and co-
operation is indispensable, if the system of international trade is to survive
the disturbances which most probably are to be expected in the (near) future.
Indeed, the MFN rule, if it really ever was a "cornerstone
5
1 of this system, is any-
how to be modified in order to embrace phenomena such as the advent of co-operation
agreements or of new commodity agreements. Much more than one rigid rule flexible
institutions are needed which are capable of safeguarding the interests of the
small partners of the international community.
From these considerations the following proposals can be deduced:
1. MFN treatment according to Article I GATT applies under principally equal con-
ditions.
2. Equal conditions do as a rule not exist
a) if contracting parties enter into regional arrangement of a permanent charac-
ter and take on special obligations. At least, an institutional framework for
consultation and arbitration is to be set up.
b) if contracting parties differ considerably in the level of economic develop-
ment.
3. In case of deviations from MFN treatment under para. 2(a) and 2(b) above, the
Contracting Parties see to it that the interests of all signatories to the
General Agreement are safeguarded. To this end
a) any arrangement to deviate froo paragraph 1 of Article I GATT is to be sub-
mitted to the Contracting Parties for consultation x uonths before be-
coming effective
b) such arrangements are reviewed annually (bi-annually) on the basis of re-
ports by the member states submitted at least x months before the reviews
c) every signatory to the General Agreement is entitled to engage the Contract-
ing Parties if its interests are seriously harmed by the activities of
arrangements under para. 2(a) and 2(b). The Contracting Parties will put
the matter on their agenda within x months.- 68 -
d) the Contracting Parties may recommend to the member states of arrangements
under para. 2(a) and 2(b) such action as they deem necessary to safeguard
the interests of other signatories to the General Agreement.
4. Deviations from paragraph 1 Article I which are not covered by para. 2(a) or
2 (b) above require the approval of the Contracting Parties according to para-
graph 5 Article XXV. Their operation is subject to the rules laid down in
para. 3 above.
Probably, these points should be completed by another one concerning emergency pro-
tection. Emergency protection is now subject to the MFN clause. As Jan Tumlir has
2 demonstrated convincingly, the need to apply the principle of MFN treatment in
case of emergency protection causes so many difficulties for the country in
question that the procedure of Article XIX has often been avoided. According to
Tumlir, also in case of emergency protection, not so much the conservation of MFN
treatment is wanted, but the protection of the interest of the weaker GATT members
3
by means of multilateral surveillance. So, perhaps, the requirement that emergency
protection should be non-discriminatory could be given up and replaced by the
installation of a procedure analogue to that proposed under para.(3) above.
This is communis opinio, supported by the practice of the GATT. See Jackson, op.
cit., p.564 with reference to the GATT practice and the preparatory work, Dam,
op.cit., p.105, Curzon, op.cit., p.118, Tumlir, Proposals for Emergency Protec-
tion against sharp Increases in Imports. Trade Policy Research Centre, London,
Guest Paper No. 1. p.6.
2
Tumlir, p.7 et seq.
3 Ibid., p.19.